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ABSTRACT 
 
The dissertation examines the state of current Sino Tibetan dialogue analyzing the early years 
of direct contact between Beijing and the Dalai Lama through protracted stalemate of nineties 
on to the current rounds of dialogue. By providing an assessment of current position of 
dialogue, this paper surveys the factors which are likely to impact the future dynamics of 
engagement under theoretical framework of the security dilemma, framing the Sino-Tibetan 
conflict as a dilemmatic and dynamic interplay of the Chinese Party-state and Tibetan nation. 
This research argues that Beijing’s mix signals in the dialogue define as bad faith justified by 
its diplomacy with Tibetan part throughout the process of engagement. With thorough 
assessment and justification of the position on the current discourse, this dissertation end with 
two fold prospects of the Sino Tibetan discussion and subsequent personal proposition on the 
importance of establishing a dialogue between two parties to settle a long standing dispute. 
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O DIÁLOGO SINO-TIBETANO: PERSPECTIVAS SOBRE O DIÁLOGO DE 
MÁ-FÉ. 
 
 
RESUMO 
 
Esta dissertação avalia o estado atual do diálogo Sino-Tibetano analisando os primeiros anos 
de contacto direto entre Pequim e o Dalai Lama através do impasse prolongado da década de 
noventa para os atuais rodadas de diálogo. Avaliando o diálogo atual, este trabalho faz um 
levantamento dos fatores que são suscetíveis de afetar as futuras dinâmicas de envolvimento 
de acordo com o quadro teórico do dilema de segurança, enquadrando o conflito Chinês-
Tibetano como uma interação dilemática e dinâmica do Partido do Estado Chinês e a nação 
Tibetana. Esta pesquisa prova que os sinais mistos de Pequim no diálogo são definidos como 
má-fé, justificado pela sua diplomacia com a parte Tibetana durante todo o processo de 
envolvimento e disputa. Com uma avaliação completa e a justificação da posição do discurso 
atual, esta dissertação finaliza com duas perspetivas de discussão, relativamente ao Sino-
Tibetano diálogo e posterior proposição pessoal sobre a importância da ocorrência de um 
diálogo entre os dois partidos, a fim da resolver o longa data diferendo. 
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Introduction 
While there is increasing awareness and respect for human rights and individual 
freedom in the world, repression, on the other hand has amplified in Tibet in last few years. 
When Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) under Mao Tsedung began to incorporate Tibetan 
regions into the People’s Republic of China (PRC), both Tibetans and the Chinese have been 
locked in a conflict in which both sides have used violence in various forms to overpower the 
other side as well as subtler hearts and minds approach to win over the other side and 
dialogue
1
 to resolve their differences peacefully.  Yet neither means brought the Chinese and 
Tibetans no closer to a resolution of their disagreement.  
In the course of the current geopolitical scenario, the issue of Tibet appears to have no 
resolution at hand while China, the world’s dominant economic power refused to 
acknowledge the existence of problems in Tibet, rest of the world even failed to deliver their 
ethical obligation driven by the games of economic interest. At this stage of Tibet’s grim 
milestone, this dissertation aims to highlight the importance and necessity of the dialogue 
between Beijing and the Central Tibetan Administration towards settling long- standing 
disputes.  
It is apparent that most Tibetans would welcome an agreement that allows a degree of 
political and cultural autonomy for their homeland, especially given their constant fears for 
the survival of their identity under the prevailing regime of Chinese policies, explains why 
Dharamsala was persistence and sometimes desperate in pursuit of negotiations with China. 
Yet, the conflict rages on as strongly as ever. In an attempt to understand the intractability of 
the Sino Tibetan conflict, the research gives rise to certain empirical questions; Why does 
Beijing deny even the existence of a ‘Tibet issue’, offering only to talk about the Dalai 
                                                          
1  C.T.A, DIIR. Dharamsala and Beijing: Initiatives and correspondence(1981-1993). Dharamsala: DIIR Publication, 1994. 
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Lama’s return after saddling it with difficult preconditions? Why does Beijing persist in its 
hard-line policies in Tibet, despite the widespread Tibetan protests and riots and international 
opprobrium? In sum, what explains the protracted nature of the Sino-Tibetan conflict?  This 
research seeks to address these questions through an analytical account of the dialogue 
process in the context of International Relations theory Realism – Security Dilemma 2 , 
framing the Sino-Tibetan conflict as a dilemmatic and dynamic interplay of the threat 
perceptions of the Chinese Party-state and the insecurities of the Tibetan nation. This research 
will demonstrate the resultant character of the Sino-Tibetan conflict as a cyclical action-
reaction process, understood in terms of Chinese state building policies and practices and the 
Tibetan resistance against them.  
The research argues that Beijing’s flicked mix signals in the dialogue process clearly 
define its intensions as bad faith driven by insecurity. The first half of the paper provides an 
analytical history on the inception of Sino Tibetan dialogue, precisely focusing on protracted 
stalemate of ninety’s on to the current rounds of dialogue. The second half of this paper 
chronicles the theoretical framework parallel to the discourse in order to highlight the 
underlying aspects of the stalemate. The research finally conclude with analysis of those 
factors which are likely to impact the future dynamics of engagement with twofold distinct 
outlook of the Sino Tibetan dialogue and a personal proposition for a sustained outcome.  
Considering the limitation of many Chinese sources tends to incline towards the 
official Chinese version, this research used a wide range of selected official documents 
published by China, Central Tibetan administration and third countries. The proceedings of 
conference and research articles written by leading authors on Tibetan study both Tibetan 
origin and foreigners were used as secondary literature. Statements of leading figure related 
                                                          
2 Brian L. Job (Ed.) The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States, Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner, 1992; John Glenn, ‘The Interregnum: The South's Insecurity Dilemma,’ Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1997: 45-63;  
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to the Sino-Tibetan conflict, news report both print and videos are also used in order make 
this writing up to date.  Finally, the review of the existing literature on the conflict and the 
subsequent introduction of the analytical framework and methodology used in this research 
develop sensible arguments and explanation on the importance of creating an efficient future 
engagement between the two parties for settling longstanding Sino Tibetan Conflict through 
dialogue and reconciliation.  
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CHAPTER  I 
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
1.1 Introduction 
 The period following Mao Zedong’s proclamation of the People’s Republic of China 
ushered the communist party of China towards achieving a greater dream over the Tibetan 
plateau. 7 October 1950 the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) invaded Chamdo, halting its 
advance 100 km to the east of Lhasa is what China claimed was the boundary of Central 
Tibet. The Tibetan government was called to send a delegation to Peking to negotiate Tibet’s 
“peaceful liberation”. China’s tactic of halting the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) and 
calling Tibet to negotiate was thus successful in defusing international criticism.
3
   
 Under threat of a continued advance of the PLA to Lhasa, the Tibetan Government 
was forced to send delegates to Beijing. On 23 May 1951, the Tibetan delegates agreed to 
sign on measures for the “Peaceful liberation of Tibet,” embodied in the 17-Point Agreement 
as the International Commission of Juries later recognized “Tibet signed at pistol-point”.4  
The imposition of the 17 Point Agreement
5
  reduced the whole of Tibet to a status of national, 
regional autonomy within the sovereignty of the People’s Republic of China. The Dalai Lama 
and the local Tibetan government of Tibet made effort to maintain the autonomy as promised 
in the agreement but no avail.   
 After the signing of the 17-Point Agreement, the PLA incorporated Lhasa and central 
Tibet into the territorial division of Tibet, which contributed to the Tibetan uprising. In 1955, 
Mao included the Tibetan provinces of Kham and Amdo in the “high Tide of Socialist 
                                                          
3 Samdhong Rinpoche, Uncompromising Truth for a compromised World: Tibetan Buddhism and Tibet’s World. (Ed. Donovan Roebert) 
World Wisdom, Canada 2006 P.g 116  
4 DIIR. Tibet: The Position in International Law. (Report of the Conference of International Lawyers on Issues Relating to Self 
Determination and Independence for Tibet), London 6-10 January 1993 
5 Fact about 17-Point Agreement. Dharamsala: DIIR Publications, 2002  (Also see Appendix A for detail) 
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Transformation” When the “democratic reforms” included forced public renunciation of 
respected Tibetan leaders and revered lamas, both areas erupted in revolt. In response, the 
Chinese introduced overwhelming number of troops and as a means of quelling the uprising, 
Eastern Tibetan collectivized during the “Great Leap Forward” of 1958.6  
 On March 1959, a large number of Tibetan surrounded the Dalai Lama’s summer 
residence of “Norbu Linka” outskirt of Lhasa due to rumors that the Chinese were planning 
to kidnap him. Growing anger and resistance to Chinese rule exploded into the Tibetan 
Uprising, days of fighting ensued, and thousand of Tibetans killed. Realizing the potential 
threat to the life of Dalai Lama, the Tibetan leader and his immediate inner circle escaped 
secretly in March 1959 and flee into exile in India. (followed by some 80,000 refugees) 
While in India, the young Dalai Lama reestablished the ‘Tibetan Government‐in‐Exile’ (also 
known as the Central Tibetan Administration) in Dharamsala, North India.  
In exile India, the Tibetan government led by the Dalai Lama engaged in the 
immediate tasks of rehabilitation of Tibetan refugees and catering the educational needs of 
young Tibetans, as well as preservation of Tibetan culture and religion.
7
 Henceforth mapping 
a definite policy concerning future political status  was not possible at the initial day of exile 
India. However, from 1967 onwards, taking into consideration of prevailing situation of the 
world in general and China in particular, the Dalai Lama and Tibetan government in Exile 
felt the importance of acquiring a future policy on the status of Tibet. A series of serious 
discussions were held with the decision-making body and wise, experienced friends of Tibet, 
as a result, in 1974 an internal decision made to pursue a policy of securing a meaningful 
autonomy for Tibet and not striving for independence to cope with the opportune time to 
dialogue with Chinese government. In March 1978, the Dalai Lama suggested that the 
                                                          
6 Samdhong Rinpoche op cit. Pg 116 
7 Kashag; Introduction to the Middle Way Approach. Dharamsala: DIIR Publications, 2007 
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Chinese authority should allow the Tibetans in Tibet to visit their parents and relatives now in 
exile and similar opportunities should be given to the Tibetans in Exile. He stated that a such 
arrangement could be confident in knowing the true situation insides Tibet.
8
   
1.2 The Sino-Tibetan dialogue       
 It seemed that a discussion of anything short of Tibet’s political status might be 
possible after Deng’s optimistic initiative but the underlying difference of two parties’ 
intention halt the running engagement at a halfway. Thus, the early years of dialogue between 
Beijing and the Dalai Lama failed to lead to a substantive result. Deng’s initial offer indicates 
his clear interest in normalizing relations with the Dalai Lama contrast the Exile Tibetan 
leader’s aspiration to talk on the Tibet issue.  
 The foundation of Beijing’s New Tibet policy undermined its own interest towards 
engagement with the exiled Tibetan leadership as the Chinese leaders solely concerned to 
bring to an end the Dalai Lama’s existence in exile and enhance the legitimacy of Chinese 
rule in Tibet. Therefore, Deng’s effort to mend relations with the Dalai Lama was part of a 
wider campaign to rehabilitate fallen political figures and normalize political life in China 
rather intending to discuss Tibetan grievance.  For the Exile Tibetan leader, the Deng’s 
initiation seemed to be a favorable platform to raise the Tibet issue. However, the wider gap 
of expectations between the two parties made it difficult to contemplate a serious dialogue, 
and it was apparent that there was, in fact, a little basis for substantive talks. 
Following reviews of the various positions taken on Deng’s invitation, it is clear that 
Deng’s positive gesture was explicitly confined and limited within the criteria of discussing 
return of the Exiled leader to China. Yet it is significant to attest the contribution it avail in 
opening the door of discussion for the Tibetan part, the current round of Sino Tibetan 
                                                          
8 CTA . "Sino Tibetan Dialogue." Available at:  http://tibet.net/sino-tibetan-dialogue-hopes-and-suspicions-1978-1987// accessed on 9 Jan. 
2014.   
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dialogue has been the result of that initiation. Reciprocating Deng’s invitation, the Dalai 
Lama gave permission to  Gyalo Thondup in his personal capacity and not representing the 
exile institution to Beijing. He met China’s paramount Deng Xiaoping in March 1979; 
Deng’s meeting was succeeded by the Tibetan delegation’s visit to Tibet and then followed 
by the exploratory mission from 1982 to 1987.  Contents of general reflection and details of 
engagement between Beijing and the Dharamsala will commence in the proceeding text. 
1.2.1 The initial contact 
Amidst the cloud of exiled Tibetan distress bounded with task of rehabilitation and 
welfare of Tibetan refugees, a climate liberalization and open door policy appeared in China 
after the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, the door to a new era in relations with exile Tibetan 
leadership opened. Mao’s death marked the end of an era of the Cultural Revolution 
devastated and divided the nation created a vacuum of power at the apex of the CCP 
leadership, which now sought to reestablish its authority and legitimacy in a country that 
widely distrusted and dissatisfied with the government.   
Less than a month after Mao’s death, the CCP under Hua Guofeng’s leadership 
arrested Mao’s widow Jiang Qing and her allies. In an effort to coalesce the Party, Hua 
pardoned the disgraced Deng Xiaoping and elevated him to the position of Vice Chairman. 
Hua’s insistence on carrying out the Maoist line and Deng’s ability to mobilize support 
within the Party for his pragmatic reform initiatives eventually led to Deng to become the 
paramount leader of the PRC.
9
 It  ushered in a new era that would produce a major shift in 
economic policy, the normalization of relations with the US, and renewed efforts to reconcile 
the Tibet issue. 
                                                          
9 Shakya, Tsering. The Dragon in the Land of Snow. London: Pimlico, 1999.p.g 376 
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While the CCP, did not immediately introduce new policy initiatives for Tibet but 
made a number of unilateral gestures to the international community for the purpose of 
proving its sincerity in dealing with Tibet. In 1978, the CCP began releasing former Tibetan 
government officials imprisoned during the Cultural Revolution, such as the 10th Panchen 
Lama. In 1979, the Party began allowing Tibetans to travel to India to visit their relatives, and 
also invited Tibetans living abroad to open businesses in Tibet.
10
  
Moreover, the CCP revived the United Front Work Department (UFWD) which had 
neglected during the Cultural Revolution. The role of the UFWD was to find common ground 
with those who were not members of the CCP for the purpose of promoting the unity of 
China. The UFWD has been instrumental in discussions with the Dalai Lama ever since 
1951, when it’s Director led negotiations with the Tibetan Kashag government that resulted 
in the Seventeen Point Agreement. These initial moves in the post-Mao era laid the 
groundwork for Beijing’s reformed Tibet policy, which sought to enhance the Party’s 
legitimacy by securing the return of the Dalai Lama to China. Gestures of goodwill 
demonstrated the CCP’s sincerity in opening negotiations with the Dalai Lama.11   
Soon after his emergence as paramount leader, Deng Xiaoping set a new dynamic in 
motion by signaling an interest in normalizing relations with the Dalai lama. At the end of 
1978, Li Juisin the then head of Xinhua News Agency in Hong Kong (de facto embassy of 
the PRC) contact Gyalo Thondup, elder brother of the Dalai Lama for a visit to Beijing to 
discuss the problem of Tibet. On 6th January 1979, a reception committee to welcome the 
                                                          
10 Ibid 372 
11 T. W. Sharlo,T. Rabgey,  Sino-Tibetan Dialouge in Post Mao Era: Lesson and Prospect, Policy Study No 12. East-West Center 
Washington, Washington DC 2004, p. 2 
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returning and visiting Tibetan exile was formed in Lhasa according to the Radio Lhasa 
Broadcast 8 January.
12
   
With approval of the Dalai Lama, Thondup visited Beijing in late February 1979 at 
his personal capacity and met UFWD director Ulanfu. Ulanfu then took Thondup to see 
Deng, on 12th March 1979 Deng said: “The basic question is whether Tibet is part of China 
or not. This should kept as criteria for testing the truth, So long as it is not accepted that Tibet 
is an integral part of China, there is nothing else to talk about.”13  Deng Further, said that the 
CCP was willing to discuss all Tibetan grievances, and he assured Thondup that the new 
leadership was committed to promoting fundamental changes. If the Dalai Lama had any 
doubts about the sincerity of the reforms, he was welcome to send a delegation to investigate 
the situation in Tibet.
14
  This condition imposed by Deng was widely interpreted in the 
Tibetan community as “anything but independence can be discussed.” Consequently this 
meeting conceit Thondup a new window of possibility favorable for the Tibetan part to 
discuss anything short of Tibet’s political status.   
The Dalai Lama saw this initial proposal as an acceptable starting point for dialogue. 
Moreover, he could not afford to ignore this conciliatory gesture due to growing international 
support for Deng and his reform initiatives. The Dalai Lama reciprocated by sending a fact-
finding delegation from Dharamsala to Tibet in August 1979.
15
  The CCP allowed the 
delegation to tour not just the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR), but all Tibetan areas. At 
such point, both the parties were eager and ready to discuss the issue but none would 
envisage the fate of that engagement towards such end.  
                                                          
12 CTA . "Sino Tibetan Dialogue." Available at:  http://tibet.net/sino-tibetan-dialogue-hopes-and-suspicions-1978-1987/ /  accessed on    
January 15, 2014 
13 Dawa Norbu, China’s Tibet Policy (Richmond, Surrey, UK: Curzon Press, 2001), 316, citing “Gist of the Chinese Views Conveyed by 
Jiang Ping, Deputy Head of the Central Committee United Front, to the three representatives sent by the Dalai Lama (October 28, 1984)” 
(Beijing: Transcript, 1984), 4. 
14 Four fact-finding delegation was sent in August 5,1979, May 1,1980; July 1, 1980 and 1985 Chronology of Sino-Tibetan Relation, 1979 to 
2001 ICT,Washington DC, 2007 
15 Tsering Shakya. op cit. pg. 376 
  19             
1.2.2 Fact finding delegations 
Deng’s public invitation for the exile Tibetan leaders was indeed a great signal of their 
flexibility. The Chinese accommodated not only by sending an invitation for the Tibetan 
parties to inspect the progress the PRC made in Tibet and their demands regarding the 
itinerary and composition of the delegation, but also their unwillingness to travel on overseas 
Chinese passports. Chinese leaders are confident that they had transformed the region 
politically, but they were more concerned about preventing open display of hostility against 
the Dalai Lama’s representatives than potential displays of support. For this reason, local 
Tibetans was instructed to restrain themselves from physically attacking the visiting exiles.
16
   
Beijing consequently caught off guard when the first delegation, which arrived in the 
summer of 1979, was greeted by a crowd numbering in the thousands and expressing their 
devotion to the Dalai Lama. To Beijing’s alarm, calls were even made openly for Tibet’s 
independence.
17
  The Tibetan reaction abruptly drew the Chinese leadership’s attention 
towards existing poor living conditions of Tibetan people with minimal economic 
development as its policy failures in Tibet. Furthermore, the outpouring of nationalist 
sentiment made it clear that the state of affairs inside Tibet was far different from what top 
officials in Beijing had been led to believe.    
Dharamsala conducted a second fact-finding delegation in May 1980. The Historian 
Tsering Shakya records that, during each visit to a Tibetan neighborhood, “major anti-
Chinese demonstrations [took place] with people are openly shouting slogans demanding 
Tibetan independence.”18  Embarrassed, the CCP canceled the delegation while it was still in 
Lhasa, and the Tibetan exile delegates returned to Dharamsala. Tibetans’ enthusiastic 
reception of the delegations proved to Dharamsala that the situation inside Tibet remained 
                                                          
16 Khetsun, Thupten. 1998. dKa’-sdug ’og gi byung-ba brjod-pa [Life of Hardship]. Dharamsala: Sherig Press. 
17 Ngapo, Jigme. 1988. “Behind the unrest in Tibet.” China Spring 2, no.2 (January/ February). 
18 Tsering Shakya. op cit. Pg 378 
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dire. The Dalai Lama could now confidently rebuff any Chinese claims about social and 
economic progress in Tibet. For the CCP, the Tibetans’ response to the delegations proved 
just how influential the Dalai Lama was.   
In September 1980, the official envoys of the Dalai Lama returned back from Beijing 
from the round of Sino-Tibetan talks to its headquarter in Dharamsala and reported the 
situation to the exiled Tibetan leader.The Dalai Lama immediately sent a letter to Deng about 
the “sad conditions” in Tibet. In his letter, Dalai Lama wrote: “Genuine effort must be made 
to solve the problem in accordance with the existing realities in a reasonable way”.19  In 
February 1980, Deng elevated one of his strongest supporters, Hu Yaobang, to the position of 
General Party Secretary (CPC). Hu’s first task was to create a five-man working committee 
on Tibet, which he chaired to assess the situation and formulated correct policies for Tibet.    
Between May 22 and June 1, 1980, Hu Yaobang led China’s own fact -finding 
delegation to central Tibet and expressed astonishment at the level of poverty in Tibet. He 
issued a six point policy directive, first; autonomy defined as "having the right to decide for 
oneself,” but this definition is not extended to the political plane and refers mainly to 
economic decentralization. Second, the policy directive indicated that the Tibetans should be 
exempt from taxes and work without pay. They would also be free from meeting compulsory 
state purchase quotas and their products could be purchased at negotiated prices. These 
economic concessions would last three to five years. Third, the report suggested a flexible 
economic policy suited to the specific and actual conditions in Tibet, which should be carried 
out with a view to diversifying the whole Tibetan economy. Fourth, Beijing would further 
increase central funds to the Tibet Autonomous Region in order to develop the local economy 
and improve living standards. Fifth, within the socialist framework, it would be necessary to 
                                                          
19 Dalai Lama’s letter to Deng Xiaoping dated March 23,1981 Available at : 
http://www.claudearpi.net/maintenance/uploaded_pics/LetterToDengXiaoping.pdf ,  accessed on January  20, 2013 
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make "vigorous efforts to revive and develop Tibetan culture, education and science. All 
ideas that ignore and weaken Tibetan culture are wrong. “Lastly, Tibetan participation in the 
local administration should be enlarged: full-time Tibetan cadres should account for more 
than two-thirds of all government functionaries in Tibet within two to three years.
20
   
Hu demanded to know whether all the money Beijing had poured into it over the years 
had thrown into the Yarlung Tsangpo River and stated that the situation reminded him of 
colonialism. Immediately he sacked General Ren Rong from the post of the “TAR” Party 
Secretary and replaced him with Yin Fatang, a Tibetan-speaking Chinese. Hu Yaobang trip to 
Tibet made him realize the mistakes that had been made by his government and announced 
major changes in policy, including the withdrawal of most Chinese cadres from Tibet.  
1.2.3 The Outcome 
Hu Yaobang’s economic concessions might accommodate the Dalai Lama’s basic 
demand made in 1978,1979 and 1981. The Chinese government expressed its willingness to 
allow the Dalai Lama to return to the “Motherland” (to China but not to Tibet) in China’s 
interest. The implications of the Dalai Lama’s return were now far less certain after the 
unexpected nationalistic sentiment of the Tibetan masses during the Tibetan delegation’s 
visit. That prompt Chinese leaders to reassess their stance toward the Dalai Lama, where a 
period of internal discussion ensued, during which the Chinese leadership became 
increasingly circumspect in their engagement with the exiled Tibetan leader. As they doubt 
whether welcoming him would serve to legitimize China’s rule of Tibet, as hoped, or would 
it reignite latent aspirations for Tibetan separatism.  
                                                          
20 Foreign Broadcast Information Service - PRC, vol. 1, no. 108, pp. Q3-6. 
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In October 1980, Deng Xiaoping signaled a retreat from engagement by pointedly 
identifying the Dalai Lama as a separatist.
21
  The growing Chinese reticence to enter into 
meaningful engagement with the Dalai Lama evidenced in its tighter control of the remaining 
fact-finding delegations.
22
  It also failed to respond to a formal letter, sent by the Dalai Lama 
in March 1981 that criticized the conditions in Tibet, while applauding Hu’s efforts to 
remedy the situation and his acknowledgment of past errors.
23
  The Chinese government 
made it clear that it was not interested in discussing the political status of Tibet.  
 On 28 July 1981, Hu conveyed to Gyalo Thondup China’s “Five-Point Proposal to 
the Dalai Lama,” which is, he emphasized, "our sincere and serious decision."  
First, China now has entered a new era of political stability, economic prosperity and 
friendly relations among all the nationalities. These trends will not change for a long time to 
come. Since the Dalai Lama and his entourage "are intelligent" they should believe in what 
the new era promises. If they don't, they can wait and see.  
Second, the Dalai Lama and those appointed by him to represent him at talks must be 
"sincere"; they must not "bargain like businessmen.” On China's part, there will be no 
punishment of those Tibetans, who took part in the 1959 Rebellion.  
Third, "we sincerely welcome back the Dalai Lama and his entourage" to permanently 
settle down in China; for once returned, the Dalai Lama can promote national unity, improve 
relations among nationalities and accelerate the progress of the four modernizations. If and 
when he returns to China. 
                                                          
21 In comments to the Panchen Lama, who resided in China, Deng stated, “You and the Dalai are different. You are patriotic and support the 
unity of the country, while the Dalai is someone who engages in separatism.”   TAR Communist Party History Chronology, October 26, 
1980. 
22 Shakya (1999: 378) and Smith (1996: 571). 
23 Khetsun, Thupten. 1998. dKa’-sdug ’og gi byung-ba brjod-pa [Life of Hardship].Dharamsala: Sherig Press. 
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Fourth, his political and economic privileges will be as those of pre-1959. He will 
appoint as vice- president of the National People's Congress as well as vice-chairman of the 
Chinese People's Political Consultative Committee. Hu emphasized that neither the Dalai 
Lama nor his entourage need worries about their living conditions or employment as China 
would guarantee their privileges. 
 Fifth, the Dalai Lama could decide when he wanted to return, and say whatever he 
wanted to at the time. China would organize a grand reception and hold a press conference.
24
   
Beijing thus refused to acknowledge the need for any political negotiations but 
attempting to reduce the Tibetan issue to the conditions for the Dalai Lama’s return.25 Two 
senior Tibetan delegations were sent to Beijing for exploratory talks in 1982 and 1984, 
respectively. They insisted the issue was not the Dalai Lama but the welfare of the six million 
Tibetans and proposed earnest political negotiations on a status short of independence for the 
entire Tibetan people, comprising the three provinces of U-Tsang, Kham and Amdo. But 
hopes for substantive talks came to an end with the firing of Hu Yao-bang (among other 
reasons, for his willingness to address the Tibetan issue) and the turning back of announced 
reforms. 
1.3 Exploratory Mission (1982 – 1987) 
On 24th April 1982, the Dalai Lama sent a three member delegation for an 
exploratory mission to Beijing with objective of kick starting a discussion on the key issue. 
The Tibetan delegation met CPC’s United Front Work Department and Yang Jingren, 
Director of the Nationalities Affairs Commission. Yang handed over to the Tibetan 
                                                          
24 Blo-mthun hu'uya'o-panigis rgyal-lo don-grub-la ta-la'i bla-mar 'zin-p'i byed-phyogs don-tsan hi' skor bka'-molgnan-wa (Beijing: 
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residence in Beijing, which was withdrawn in 1988. 
25 D. Norbu, China’s Dialogues With the Dalai Lama 1979-90: Prenegotiation Stage of Dead End? “Pacific Affairs”, Vol. 64, No. 3 ,1991, p. 
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delegation a copy of China’s “Five-Point Policy towards the Dalai Lama”26 , which was 
supposed to have given earlier to Gyalo Thondup by Hu Yaobang in 1981. Though the 
Tibetan delegation sought to discuss more than just the Dalai Lama’s return and submitted 
their proposal that demanded the unification of all ethnically Tibetan areas under a single 
political and administrative entity, the Chinese leaders contended that the Tibet issue was 
forever resolved with the introduction of “democratic reforms” in Tibet and the creation of 
“Tibet Autonomous Region” 
The disclosure of China’s Five-Point Policy clearly reflected that Beijing was only 
interested in the unconditional return of His Holiness the Dalai Lama to Tibet and not at all 
interested in discussing the issue of Tibet. The Tibetan delegation returned to Dharamshala 
on 8 June 1982, after five weeks of talks in Beijing and said it had “cordial, free and frank 
discussions with the authorities of the People’s Republic of China”.  Later an article 
published in Beijing Review of 15 November 1982 entitled Policy Towards Dalai Lama,
27
  
disclosing the content of Beijing’s discussions with the three-member Tibetan delegations. 
"The Tibetan delegation sent by the Dalai Lama requested the central authorities to accord 
Tibet the same treatment as provided for Taiwan in the Chinese Government’s nine-point 
principle, and all the areas inhabited by Tibetans in Sichuan, Qinghai, Gansu and Yunnan be 
incorporated with Tibet to establish a unified big Tibet autonomous region".  
In response to the Chinese statements and commentaries published in Beijing Review 
of 15 November 1982, the Bureau of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, New Delhi issued a press 
statement on 22 November which said: “According to news reports that quoted latest Peking 
(Beijing) Review, the Central Chinese leadership seem to have some misapprehensions and 
misunderstandings about the discussions held in May this year when His Holiness the Dalai 
                                                          
26 Xizang Qingkuang Jianjie [Summary of Conditions in Tibet], Zhonggong Xizang Zizhiqu Dangwei Xuanchuanbu Bian [TAR CCP 
Propaganda Department] (July 1985) p.32. Translation by the authors. 
27 Beijing review, Policy toward Dalai Lama. 1982. Available at: http://www.c3sindia.org/tibet/240 Accessed on  January 23rd, 2014 
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Lama’s delegation was in Peking for exploratory talk. His Holiness is, however, confident 
that the Peking authorities will sooner or later realistically recognize the reasonable desires 
and aspirations of the Tibetan people”.28   
The Chinese bluntly rejected the Dalai Lama’s proposal, indicating that the only basis 
of negotiations were Hu’s five points. The CCP believed that it did not need to compromise 
with the Dalai Lama because the new reforms appeared to be working towards alleviating 
Tibetans grievances. In July 1982, the Panchen Lama visited the TAR for the first time since 
1964 and endorsed Beijing’s new policies. Moreover, in February 1983, the Dalai Lama 
unexpectedly announced that he hoped to visit Tibet in 1985 “if the present trend of 
improving the situation in Tibet continues in the right direction.”29   
In early 1984, the CCP convened the Second Tibet Work Forum in Beijing. In order 
to bring the pace of economic development inside Tibet in line with the rest of China, Beijing 
initiated “the opening of Tibet”, which would bolster the tourism industry in Tibet, loosen 
restrictions on Chinese migration into the region for business and trade, and inject money into 
the Tibetan economy through various infrastructure projects. The Forum also reaffirmed the 
Party’s commitment to rapprochement with the Dalai Lama, and ensured greater autonomy 
and more religious freedom for Tibet, but the negotiations with the Dalai Lama would remain 
grounded in the 1981 five-point proposal.  
In 1984, TAR Party Secretary Yin Fatang rearticulated the Chinese offer to talk with 
the Dalai Lama, however, framed his appeal with a direct criticism of the Dalai Lama: “his 
greatest mistake is treason. He is not only carrying out traitorous activities but also spreading 
erroneous remarks in foreign countries. He has done a disservice to the motherland and the 
                                                          
28 CTA . "Sino Tibetan Dialogue."  Available at:  http://tibet.net/sino-tibetan-dialogue-hopes-and-suspicions-1978-1987/ / accessed on   17 
Jan. 2014.   
29 Tsering Shakya, op cit. Pg 393 
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people. This is very bad, and he has discredited himself.”30  It was the first instance of harsh 
rhetoric against the Dalai Lama in the post-Mao reform era. 
In October 1984, the CCP agreed to meet with a delegation from Dharamsala in 
Beijing. The Dalai Lama once again sent the same three-member Tibetan exploratory mission 
to Beijing. The Tibetan delegation met Deputy Director, Jiang Ping, and several other 
officials of the CPC’s United Front Work Department. At the meeting, Jiang Ping reiterated 
Beijing’s “Five-Point Policy towards the Dalai Lama” and said, “It will remain unchanged, 
no matter what happens. It should be the basis for any dialogue between the two sides”. The 
Tibetan exile delegation again sought to deflect the Chinese attempt to limit the scope of 
negotiations to just the personal status of the Dalai Lama, and proposed the de-militarization 
of Tibet and the creation of a “zone of peace.” The Chinese once again rejected it, sending a 
warning to the Dalai Lama not to “beat around the bush or look for a bargain.”31   
On 28 November 1984, Xinhua News Agency released the document of Beijing’s 
“Five-Point Policy towards the Dalai Lama” to the public. It was followed by another 
statement, on 2 December, “the Tibetan delegates doubted the possibility of the Dalai Lama’s 
visit to Tibet” and they had once again sought “Taiwan formula for Tibet, inclusion of certain 
areas in a greater Tibet, and the withdrawal of Chinese troops from the region”. On 3 
December 1984, the Bureau of His Holiness the Dalai Lama in New Delhi refuted the claims 
made in Xinhua statement. The Bureau said; “the purpose of sending the Tibetan delegation 
to Beijing was to maintain our dialogues with the Chinese authorities and to discuss mainly 
                                                          
30 Carlson, Allen. “Beijing's Tibet Policy: Securing Sovereignty and Legitimacy.” Policy Studies 4 (2004). East-West Centre Washington. 
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the aspirations of the six million Tibetan people and not about the return of His Holiness the 
Dalai Lama”.32   
On 16 December1984, His Holiness the Dalai Lama announced the cancellation of his 
proposed visit to Tibet in 1985. In a formal press statement, His Holiness the Dalai Lama 
said, “As I have often said in the past, as long as the Tibetan people are not fully satisfied, the 
question of my return does not arise at all. The very fact that the Chinese are insistent that I 
return and stay in Beijing clearly indicates that there are still problems inside Tibet”.33  
The continued success of the CCP’s reform efforts bolstered its stance towards 
negotiations with the Dalai Lama. Popular opinion in Tibet towards the CCP was at an all 
time high in 1985. And that same year, Hu Yaobang replaced TAR Party Secretary Yin 
Fatang with Wu Jinghua, a Yi minority and liberal proponent of Hu’s reform initiatives 
which were particularly popular with Tibetans. Under Wu, the TAR enjoyed a significant 
degree of autonomy in comparison to the years after 1959. Five of the six Deputy Secretaries 
that Wu appointed were ethnic Tibetans.  
The fourth Tibetan fact-finding delegation led by Woeser Gyaltsen Kundeling arrived 
in Beijing in June 1985. Before leaving for Amdo, northeastern Tibet, the delegation met 
with the senior officials of the CPC’s United Front Work Department on 21 June. In response 
to the Chinese officials in the meeting, the Tibetan delegate said, " as far as the 
Beijing’s‘Five-Point Policy towards the Dalai Lama concerned; Tibetan people had already 
rejected it."  
In the United States, in an unusual gesture on Capitol Hill, China’s President Li 
Xiannian was presented with a letter, written by Congressman Charlie Ross and Senator 
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Claiborne Pell and signed by 150 prominent members of both houses of Congress, expressing 
concern for the situation in Tibet. The letter, dated 9 July 1985, urged the Chinese leadership 
to resolve the Tibetan issue through dialogue with His Holiness the Dalai Lama.
34
   On 23 
December 1985, Britain’s Parliamentary Human Rights Group wrote a letter to the China’s 
Premier Zhao Ziyang, asking him to work out arrangements with His Holiness the Dalai 
Lama that accord with “justified and reasonable” wishes of the Tibetan people “to manage 
their own affairs”.35 
In August 1985, Beijing announced that the local TAR government could “disregard” 
the central government’s regulations that did not conform to the specific conditions in the 
region. And in July 1986, the TAR government initiated a trial basis for Tibetan to adopted as 
the main language of administration. According to Tsering, at this time, more and more 
Tibetans inside China became “willing to accept the limits imposed by the Chinese,” seeking 
to address practical “questions of policy and the needs of the Tibetans,” and not necessarily 
the fundamental issue of independence. Thus, one see that the period of economic reform and 
increased prosperity in the early to mid-1980s coincided with a loosening of Han control over 
Tibet. 
The CCP began loosening restrictions on religious practices and institutions. Tibetans 
began publicly to display photos of the Dalai Lama, and to defy Chinese laws restricting the 
rebuilding of monasteries and the entrance of minors into the monastic tradition. While 
relaxed regulations on religion bolstered public opinion of the CCP in Tibet, they ironically 
revealed the centrality of the Dalai Lama in Tibetan culture, bringing to the fore the question 
of his return to China. 
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In January 1985, the Tibetan Administration-in-exile, for the first time, issued a 
formal public statement on the Sino-Tibetan talks. The Assembly of Tibetan People’s 
Deputies (Tibetan Parliament-in-exile) rejected the China’s “Five-Point Policy towards the 
Dalai Lama”. In a statement issued on 5 February 1985, the Chairman of the Assembly said 
that the Chinese terms are nothing but “ move to reduce the Tibetan cause to the personal 
issue of His Holiness the Dalai Lama. The Chinese leaders pretend to forget His Holiness’s 
statement that the Tibetan people’s struggle is a struggle for the satisfactory happiness for the 
six million Tibetans. The Tibetan people will never be fully satisfied as long as they live 
under foreign domination”.36  
In 1987, Gyalo Thondup met privately with Chinese officials in Beijing. Thondup 
pushed for a resumption of the talk. However, the CCP insisted that it would not accept a 
delegation composed of officials from the exile government. The progressive elements within 
the CCP leadership, such as Hu, had hypothesized that a more liberal Tibet policy would curb 
the Dalai Lama’s hand at the negotiating table with the Chinese as well as his influence 
internationally. They based their reformed Tibet policy on the principle that the CCP’s 
sovereignty over Tibet rested with the Tibetan people, and, as a result, pinned the successful 
resolution of the Tibet issue to the return of the Dalai Lama. Hu Yaobang’s failure to secure 
the Dalai Lama’s return undermined his influence in the Party, while a series of student 
protests broke out in China in 1987, Hu’s political opponents successfully blamed his liberal 
policies for the instability, and forced him to resign as Party Secretary. In January 1987, Hu 
Yaobang was removed from the post of General Secretary of the Communist Party of China 
(CPC). One of the reasons stated for his demotion was his ethnic-sensitive liberal policy in 
Tibet.  
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The purge of Hu Yaobang from the post of Party Secretary (CPC) convinced 
Dharamsala that Beijing would be less accommodating in future rounds of dialogue with the 
Dalai Lama. In his official statement on 10 March 1987, the Dalai Lama said, “It seems there 
is no desire on the part of China to resolve the issue on the basis of mutual respect and for 
mutual benefit”. He further said, “I would like to reiterate that the issue of Tibet is not about 
the power and position of either the Dalai Lama or the future of Tibetan refugees alone, but 
rather it is the question of the rights and freedoms of the six million Tibetans… The issue of 
Tibet is fundamentally political with international ramifications and as such only a political 
solution can provide a meaningful answer”.37   
Dharamsala noted these changes in Beijing with growing alarm. Throughout the 
1980s, the Dalai Lama had focused his efforts on negotiations with the Beijing. Over the 
course of the talks, however, both Dharamsala and Beijing had become increasingly stubborn 
and cynical about the dialogue process. Beijing remained open to the principle of dialogue 
and kept Hu’s five-point proposal on the table for discussions. Apparently Beijing’s refusal to 
meet the exile Tibetan delegates left the Tibetan leaders with the only option of seeking 
support from International community to bolster external pressure on Beijing to negotiate its 
Tibet policy with the Tibetan part. 
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          CHAPTER II 
THE STALEMATE 
2.1 Internationalization of Tibet issue (1987 – 1990) 
The potential hope of discussing Tibet issue in the early eighties was shattered by the 
PRC’s precondition for the exiled Tibetan leader. In the state of that reality, the Dalai Lama 
realized that there is no way to force PRC to continue talk, but to turn to the International 
community for help. The Dalai Lama’s shift in Tibetan strategy developed the Tibet issue 
towards a higher profile when he made explicitly political appeals to the international 
community. On September 21, 1987 the Dalai Lama made his first appeal before the U.S. 
Congressional Human Rights Caucus, he announced that he was compelled to appeal to the 
international community because of the Chinese refusal to negotiate. In a strongly worded 
speech that described Tibet as an “independent state under illegal occupation,” "Instead of 
addressing the real issues facing the six million Tibetan people, China has attempted to 
reduce the question of Tibet to a discussion of my own personal status."
38
    
The Dalai Lama delivered his five-point counter proposal which includ(1) 
Transformation of the whole of Tibet (Inner and Outer) into a zone of peace; (2) 
Abandonment of China's population transfer policy which threatens the very existence of the 
Tibetans as a people; (3) Respect for the Tibetan people's fundamental human rights and 
democratic freedoms; (4) Restoration and protection of Tibet's natural environment and the 
abandonment of China's use of Tibet for the production of nuclear weapons and dumping of 
nuclear waste; (5) Commencement of earnest negotiations on the future status of Tibet and of 
relations between Tibetan and Chinese peoples.
39
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Soon after the Dalai Lama’s speech at the U.S. Congressional Human Rights Caucus, 
the congressional supporters applauded his effort but on the other side, the US State 
Department registered its strong disapproval of the speech and sought to clarify the US 
government position on the status of Tibet. In 1985, members of Congress signed a letter 
addressed to Chinese President Li Xiannian calling for direct negotiations with the Dalai 
Lama. In June 1987, Congress passed a bill declaring Tibet to be an occupied country
40
 and 
enact non-binding measures declaring that the US should make Tibet a higher policy priority 
and should urge China to establish a constructive dialogue with the Dalai Lama.
41
  Though 
US support for human rights was “unwavering,” the spokesperson asserted that it was not in 
the interest of the US to link the issue of human rights in Tibet to any particular political 
program. The State Department disavowed any support for the proposal, and stressed that 
neither the US nor any member of the UN recognized Tibetan independence.
42
  Thus, the 
American reaction to the Dalai Lama’s proposal came as a blend of its increasing sympathy 
with Tibet as well as fears of a rising China. 
The Chinese quickly rejected the Dalai Lama’s five-point peace plan and issued a 
detailed rejection,
43
  though this was the first public announcement of Dharamsala’s proposal, 
Beijing was already familiar with its essential features from the talks of 1984. What worried 
Beijing was not only the significance of the Dalai Lama’s new initiative and venue of its 
presentation, but also the sudden eruption of a pro-independence protest in Lhasa less than a 
week after the Dalai Lama’s speech. On September 27, 1987, 21 monks from Drepung 
Monastery staged the first pro-independence demonstration since Tibetan delegation visited 
Tibet in 1979 and 1980. The Chinese police immediately suppressed the protest and arrested 
many of the monks. On 1 October, Tibetan monks and lay people staged a second protest, 
                                                          
40 Tsering Shakya, op. cit., p. 414. 
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which again led to suppression and arrests. Tibetans then gathered outside the police station 
holding the detainees and demanded their release, which soon escalated to violence when the 
police fired into the crowd, killing eight to ten people.
44
   
The triumph of the Dalai Lama’s effort in securing International attention upset China 
tremendously . Xinhua’s response to his speech chastised the US for interfering “in China’s 
internal affairs” and allowing “the Dalai Lama to conduct political activities aimed at 
advocating independence for Tibet and sabotaging the unity of China.”45  The CCP leadership 
directly linked this civil unrest to the external activities of the Dalai Lama and his 
international supporters. A Beijing Review editorial classified the Tibetan “riots” as having 
been “designed in faraway quarters as an echo to the Dalai Lama’s separatist activities during 
his visits to the United States and Europe.”46    
For Beijing, these protests were particularly disturbing as they served to confirm the 
Dalai Lama’s representations of human rights violations at the hands of repressive policies. 
They reacted by accusing the Dalai Lama of instigating and planning the Lhasa 
demonstrations. In a memorandum dated October 17, 1987, Yan Minfu, the head of the 
United Front Work Department (UFWD) accused the Dalai Lama of raising an outcry for 
Tibetan independence by promulgating the five-point peace plan. The memorandum 
concluded, nonetheless, that the Dalai Lama was still welcome to return under the terms of 
Hu Yaobang’s five-point policy. 
In November 1987, the new head of the Party Zhao Ziyang convened a Politburo 
meeting in Beijing to discuss the situation in Tibet. The meeting concluded with note that 
Beijing’s Tibet policy had been too liberal marking CCP’s retreat from its prior approach to 
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resolving the Tibet question. Considering the international community’s closer attention to 
the situation in Tibet, Beijing cautiously felt the need to prove that its policy initiatives were 
working. Thus, the Chinese leadership made a number of gestures in the lead-up to the 
festival in order to ensure its success and calm the restive monk population.  
The Panchen Lama visited Lhasa in January 1988 and announced in front of a crowd 
of assembled monks that the government would give reparations to three major Lhasa 
monasteries and one day prior to this announcement, the local government released 59 
detained monks as a gesture of goodwill.
47
  However, Chinese attempts to defuse the situation 
turn out unsuccessful when a spontaneous protest for Tibetan independence erupted on the 
last day of the Great Prayer Festival,  followed by more arrests, further antagonizing the 
Tibetan population.   
Later on 15 June 1988 at Strasbourg (France), the Dalai Lama addressed the European 
Parliament and made his first public statement outlining the conditions for his return. His 
proposal included the unification of ethnographic Tibet under a “self-governing democratic 
political entity,” and the greater protection of religious and human rights for Tibetans.48  His 
Proposal defined the "frame- work for Sino-Tibetan negotiations" with major political 
concessions to China. The PRC, he said, “could remain responsible for Tibet's foreign policy 
and defence. But Tibet should have its own Foreign Affairs Bureau dealing with commerce, 
education, culture, religion, tourism, science, sports and other non-political activities. About 
defence, China could have the right to maintain a restricted number of military installations in 
Tibet until such time as demilitarization and neutralization could achieve through a regional 
peace conference and international agreement.”49   
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As far as the Dalai Lama concerned, his Strasbourg Statement represents a 
compromise solution to the controversial Tibetan question. While eschewing persistent 
Tibetan claims to independence, it calls for a greater degree of domestic autonomy, which 
does not conflict with Chinese sovereignty or security concerns. He specifies the kind of 
political system he wishes to establish in Tibet, implying complete domestic autonomy 
including the whole of Tibet, known as Cholka-sum (U-Tsang, Kham and Amdo), should 
become a self- governing democratic political entity founded on law by agreement of the 
people, comprised of a popularly elected chief executive, a bicameral legislative branch, and 
an independent judicial system.    
Although the Chinese Embassy at New Delhi, earlier informed the Dalai Lama's 
representative Tashi Wangdi that neither the Five-point Peace Plan nor the Strasbourg 
Statement could be the basis for negotiation, they did not issue a written reply until 23 
September 1988, when the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi delivered their formal response to 
Dalai Lama’s proposal.50  The CCP announced that they were still open to dialogue with the 
Dalai Lama and that the talks could hold in “Beijing, Hong Kong or any of [the PRC’s] 
embassies or consulates abroad.” However, the announcement explicitly indicated that no 
foreigners should involve and  also specified two prerequisites for the resumption of talks: 1) 
the exiled Kashag government in Dharamsala should not involve, and; 2) the Strasbourg 
proposal cannot be the basis of negotiations because it has “not at all relinquished the concept 
of the ‘independence of Tibet.51  
While Dharamsala welcomed the Chinese readiness to hold ‘talks with the Dalai 
Lama’, but the parameters outlined in the message were disappointing as the Chinese 
memorandum still embodied the Central tenets and guidelines set by Deng Xiaoping and Hu 
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Yaobang in 1981. As Shakya states “It was apparent that when Beijing announced its desire 
to hold ‘talks with the Dalai Lama,' it meant that the meetings would hold between the person 
of the Dalai Lama and the Chinese representative. The implication was clear that the 
discussion would concern solely with the Dalai Lama’s return there would be no question of 
discussing the issue of the status of Tibet. Further, it reinforced by the refusal of acknowledge 
in any shape or form the existence of the ‘exiled government.' This was clearest Chinese 
statement on the limits any scopes of discussion.”52    
The condition imposed by PRC were unacceptable, by taking up the first sentence of 
Chinese statement, Dharamsala publicly announced that the talks would hold in Geneva in 
January 1989 with names of negotiating team, which appeared to disregard the terms of 
Beijing’s invitation by listing a Dutch lawyer as part of the team, albeit as an advisor. 
Addition to Beijing’s disappointment, the formal Tibetan reply was conveyed to the Chinese 
government only after the announcements made, being transmitted on October 25 by Ala 
Jigme, a senior member of the Tibetan government in- exile, to the Chinese embassy in New 
Delhi.  
The PRC took the delayed formal response as a sign of insincerity and bad faith, 
especially since the Tibetans had already announced the date and venue of the talks. On 
November 18, the PRC formally expressed its disappointment in a message sent through its 
embassy in New Delhi. In addition to disapproving of exile Tibetan’s public announcement 
and disregards its terms of the invitation, Beijing also rejected all six members of the 
negotiating team on the grounds of their engagement in “splittist” activities as well as the 
involvement of the Dutch lawyer. The message reiterated a desire to have direct talks with the 
Dalai Lama, though it also expressed a willingness to meet with a “trusted representative” 
such as his elder brother Gyalo Thondup. Furthermore, this new message suggested that 
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Beijing would be the most suitable venue for the talk. Thus, while the PRC claimed to be 
open to talk, it was, in fact, increasingly rigid in its approach to the Dalai Lama and his 
representatives.  
On 5 December 1988, the Tibetan government-in-exile defended its choice of 
delegates and insisted that the Strasbourg proposal given the most appropriate basis for 
discussions. No formal response to this message was forthcoming, as the two sides appeared 
to reach an impasse over what Dharamsala would later characterize as “procedural issues.”53  
For Beijing the question of how to manage their engagement with the Dalai Lama was put on 
hold as the situation in Tibet rapidly deteriorated with a new pro-independence protest 
erupted, leading to the police firing at unarmed monks. Alarmed by the seething ethnic 
turmoil, the Chinese leaders adopted a harder line policy by dismissing liberal-minded Wu 
Jinghua from post of first party secretary of the TAR and replacing him by Hu Jintao in early 
January 1989.  
Amid this deteriorating situation, the Panchen Lama died unexpectedly in January 
1989, providing the moderate elements in the CCP leadership with one final opportunity to 
satisfy their reform policies to secure the return of the Dalai Lama to the motherland. China’s 
Buddhist Association invited the Dalai Lama to Beijing to participate in funeral services for 
the Panchen Lama, letting him know that this would be an opportune time to discuss the 
political situation in Tibet informally with top government officials.  
Beijing was more trusting of the Dalai Lama than his advisors, and its offer to 
negotiate with him directly sought to break the dialogic deadlock. Despite assurances that 
there will be an opportunity for direct high-level talks, the Dalai Lama declined the invitation. 
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Tibetologist Melvyn Goldstein speculates that the Dalai Lama’s refusal to attend the Panchen 
Lama’s memorial service in 1989 was motivated by exile leaders’ fears that in direct 
negotiations, the Dalai Lama might accept a less favorable compromise than hoped.
54
  
 The ultimate failure of the reform era dialogue was due to mistrust on both sides, 
specifically their understanding of the other side’s unwillingness to reciprocate concessions. 
For the CCP, the modification of its five-point proposal to allow the Dalai Lama to live in 
Lhasa was met with Dharamsala’s refusal to narrow the scope of negotiations to the Dalai 
Lama’s personal status. On the other hand, the Dalai Lama’s disavowal of Tibetan 
independence in the Strasbourg proposal was not taken in good faith by the CCP.  
Deadlocked negotiations on the Dalai Lama’s return, the continuing demonstrations in Tibet, 
and escalating international pressure pushed Beijing to abandon its moderate Tibet policy in 
favor of one that sought to consolidate the Party’s power and stabilize the restive region. 
Furthermore, the appointment of Hu Jintao as TAR Party Secretary and his subsequent 
declaration of martial law in Tibet in March 1989 were the clearest indications that Beijing 
had shifted to its moderate Policy towards a hard-line Tibet policy. 
2.2 The Confrontation (1990 – 2001)  
Dharamsala’s premature announcement of the date and venue of the 1988 talks and 
naming of a foreigner to the Tibetan negotiating team overturned the window of opportunity 
for discussion. Furthermore, the Dalai Lama’s failure to visit Beijing in 1989 reinforced 
Beijing the understanding that the exiled Tibetan leadership was not firmly committed to 
seeking a negotiated solution with Beijing. Later on April 19, 1989 Dharamsala sent a 
message to the Chinese leadership indicating that the Dalai Lama’s representatives would be 
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willing to meet in Hong Kong, one of the places mentioned in the Chinese message of 
September 1988, by that time Beijing was no longer responsive. 
Lhasa was now tightly controlled under Hu Jintao’s martial law, and the instability 
engendered by Tiananmen crackdown in June triggered a reorganization of the PRC 
leadership, including the removal of those who had been the key in promoting talks with the 
Dalai Lama through the late 1980s. One of them was Yan Minfu, a protégé of Hu Yaobang, 
ousted from his position as head of the United Front. Because of his support to Zhao Ziyan 
during the Tiananmen demonstrations and moreover being an instrumental in engineering the 
1989 invitation for the Dalai Lama to attend the Panchen Lama’s funerary ceremonies.  
In 1989, while power politics was redrawing the political landscape in Chinese 
Communist Party, the world itself was being transformed following the eastern European 
communist regimes fell in rapid succession. The same year, the Nobel Peace Prize was 
awarded to the Dalai Lama, further raising his international visibility and prestige. Toward 
the end of this turbulent year, the Chinese authorities reached a turning point in their 
approach to the Dalai Lama.  At a meeting of the politburo on October 19, 1989, it was 
decided that the recent turmoil in Tibet was caused by the relaxing of political controls since 
liberalization.   The moderate approach of seeking a rapprochement with the Dalai Lama had 
been ill conceived, and it adopted the official line that China’s problems in Tibet could 
manage without his involvement.  The meeting concluded as the turning point of PRC’s hard-
line approach on the enforcement of social stability while reaffirming rapid economic 
development as the centerpiece of its strategy.  
Apprehending the air of instability inside Tibet, Beijing reinforced the dual strategy of 
Carrot and Stick to control the situation. It strengthened military and paramilitary 
organization in Tibet, a large number of additional soldiers was moved in Tibet following the 
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imposition of martial law in Lhasa. In first three days of military rule in Lhasa, 300 Tibetans 
were arrested, and Lhasa valley remained under military rule for thirteen months. Closed 
circuit cameras installed at the site of the most demonstrations of Barkhor overlooking 
Jhokhang temple. By the end of 90’s, there was significant increased in the proportion of 
PRC’s annual budget on security. 
The Dalai Lama’s international campaign on the human rights abuse in Tibet and his 
successive encounter with western leaders appended the growth of Beijing’s distrust. The 
early ninety’s witness a series of the Dalai Lama’s public gestures toward breaking the 
stalemate,
55
  but Beijing steeled itself from remitting any response in such inhospitable 
international climate.  However, the communication between Dharamsala and Beijing did 
maintain through Thondup, but it did not move further. The tentative interest in engagement 
signaled in the immediate aftermath of Strasbourg had come to an end with the withdrawal of 
Strasbourg proposal in 1991.
56
  
In 1993, a new wave of protests broke out in central and northeastern Tibet, and the 
Chinese response was to take an even harder line in the area and against the exiles.
57
  On 23 
May 1993, thousands of Tibetans gathered in the street of Lhasa, to demonstrate against 
grievances caused by the rapid economic reforms. What began as an economic protest ended 
in calls for independence,
58
  this incident was followed by an outbreak of political protests in 
rural Tibetan areas stretching from the Lhasa valley to southern Qinghai province.  
Understanding the necessity of implementing new approaches to curb the Lhasa 
outbreak, PRC’s senior leaders convened, “Third Tibet Work Forum” in Beijing on 20 July, 
                                                          
55 These included, for example, offering to meet Li Peng during his December 1991 visit in New Delhi. In a speech at Yale, the Dalai Lama 
also proposed to visit Tibet himself. 
56 Dalai Lama’s March 10, 1991 statement, 1991, Available at: http://www.dalailama.com/messages/tibet/10th-marcharchive/1991. Also in 
Kashag’s statement on Tibetan Democracy Day, September 2, 1991.  
57 For an account of these developments, see Tibet Information Network (1996). 
58 Tsering Shakya. op. cit., p. 439 
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1994 decided to follow a hard-line policy on Tibet. Beijing not only  tightened the Control 
over religious institutions known to be hotbeds of nationalist aspiration but, more 
significantly over Tibetan cadres where the Tibetan party members and administrators were 
closely monitored for signs of political deviance. Leading cadres, in particular, were 
prohibited from keeping not only photos of the Dalai Lama, but also generic religious objects 
such as rosaries.  The Propaganda Committee of the “TAR” Communist Party summarized 
the decisions of the Third Work Forum in a document for internal distribution among CPC 
cadres, entitled, A Golden Bridge Leading into a New Era.
59
  The document revealed that the 
Chinese government was no longer seriously interested in dialogue with the Dalai Lama or 
his return.  
The Third Work Forum expressed a further hardening of Chinese attitudes toward the 
Dalai Lama. Bitter over American efforts to link US trade policy to human rights issues, 
senior leaders formally endorsed the view that the Dalai Lama was an agent of hostile 
Western forces, led by the US, whose goal was to undermine China’s stability and territorial 
integrity. With this public denunciation, the Chinese leadership provided high-level 
authorization for an intensive campaign against the Dalai Lama, the first such campaign since 
the beginning of liberalization in 1978. In this campaign, which publicly launched in January 
1995, vitriolic attacks on the Dalai Lama inside Tibet reached levels unprecedented since the 
Cultural Revolution, prompting observers to comment that rapprochement was now further 
away than ever.  
Chinese distrust of the Dalai Lama reached new heights in 1995, when he formally 
recognized Gendun Choekyi Nyima, a six-year old boy from a semi-nomadic family in Tibet, 
as the reincarnation of the 10th Panchen Lama.
60
  From Beijing’s point of view, this attempt 
                                                          
59 CTA . "Sino Tibetan Dialogue." Available at:  http://tibet.net/sino-tibetan-dialogue-confrontation-1994-2001/ / accessed on 7 Feb. 2014.   
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to exclude the Chinese authorities from the succession was an aggressive political act that 
signaled the Dalai Lama’s disregard for the principles of dialogue and reconciliation. On 16 
May 1995, the Chinese government rejected the Dalai Lama’s decision and a spokesman for 
the State Council’s Bureau for Religious Affairs described the Dalai Lama’s nomination as 
“totally illegal and invalid”.61  On the same day, Chatrel Rinpoche, the leader of the Search 
Committee of the Panchen Lama’s reincarnation, was detained in Chengdu along with his 
assistant Jampa Chungla, for “colluding with the Dalai Lama.” Similarly, the 11th Panchen 
Lama, Gendun Choekyi Nyima, along with his family, was moved to an unknown location, 
where he remains under Chinese custody.  
In July 1995, the “TAR” Party Secretary, Chen Kuiyuan, criticized the Dalai Lama as 
“not only reactionary politically, but also a religious renegade who degenerated into 
betraying Buddhism”, and called upon Tibetans to “mercilessly expose and denounce the 
Dalai Lama’s conspiracy and criminal acts.”  A clear indication of Chinese attitudes toward 
the exile Tibetan leader magnified when Beijing followed series of high level intensive 
campaign against the legitimacy of the Dalai Lama.
62
  By the end of 1995, the Chinese 
government announced Gyaltsen Norbu as the 11th Panchen Lama, vilified Gendun Choekyi 
Nyima and imposed a strict ban on the photographs of the Dalai Lama and Gendun Choekyi 
Nyima labeled as “reactionary literature”. A series of reports blaming the Dalai Lama was 
published on Xizang Ribao (Tibet Daily) in February 1996, accusing the Dalai Lama of 
unrest in Tibet; calling for the intensification of the propaganda offensive against the 
influence of the Dalai Lama, and warning monasteries and nunneries where monks and nuns 
involved in political unrest to face their closure.
63
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While the Exile Tibetan leader continues his international campaign and their 
intensified support to facilitate early and peaceful resolution of the Tibetan issue through 
negotiation, Beijing counteract them by launching three major political campaigns of 
“Patriotic Education”, “Spiritual Civilisation”, and “Strike Hard” and stepped up repression 
even further. The “Patriotic Education” and “Spiritual Civilisation” are tailored to undermine 
Tibetan religion, culture and language, “Strike Hard” is targeted against Tibetan political 
activism; this ranges from speaking to foreigners to possessing publications produced by the 
Tibetan Administration-in-exile and participating in peaceful protest demonstration. 
When Chinese President Jiang Zemin visits India on 28 November 1996, the Dalai 
Lama issued a statement urging the Chinese President to reverse China’s repressive policy in 
Tibet. He said: “Although I have a strong desire to meet President Jiang Zemin while he is in 
India it is obvious that in view of the new wave of repression and the ongoing campaign to 
denounce me inside Tibet the prospect of such a meeting is unrealistic. I, therefore, take this 
opportunity to urge President Jiang Zemin to reverse China’s repressive policy in Tibet.”  
The period most of the 1990s characterized by a bitter standoff between China and 
Dharamsala fueled both by Beijing’s hard-line policy on Tibet and the exiled Tibetan 
leadership’s uneven commitment to engagement. While in US, the public support for Tibet 
reached a high level by pushing Clinton administrative to raise Tibet issue with Beijing. The 
administration for the first time appointed a special coordinator for Tibet policy within State 
Department, whose mission would include the promotion of dialogue with Dalai Lama. With 
American and other leaders’ persuasion on Tibet issue took place, same time when Jiang 
Zemin was moving Sino-US relation as his core foreign policy. In early 1997, direct channels 
between Dharamsala and the Chinese leadership were quietly re-established. After three 
rounds of informal meetings, Jiang Zemin publicly acknowledged in 1998 that contacts with 
the Dalai Lama were underway. However, within weeks of the announcement the channels of 
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communication broke down because of institutional resistance to talks and by political rivalry 
within the Chinese leadership. 
2.3 Perspective of CTA and PRC  
In the following section examines the perspective from both CTA and PRC’s point of 
view in order to understand the reason behind development of confrontation. 
2.3.1. CTA’s Perspective and the course of Tibetan freedom struggle  
In the wake of Beijing’s intensified campaign on the Dalai Lama and closure of the 
passage of Sino Tibetan discussion,  around two hundred forty exiled Tibetan representatives 
took part in a three day workshop at Dharamshala in July 1996  to discuss a proposed 
referendum on the future course of the Tibetan struggle as proposed by the Dalai Lama in his 
10th March statements of 1994. He said: “I must now recognize that my approach has failed 
to produce any progress either substantive negotiations or in contributing to overall 
improvement of situation in Tibet.” And he continued: “We have had to place our hopes on 
international support and help in bringing about meaningful negotiation, if this fails, then I 
will no longer pursue this policy with a clear conscience. I feel strongly that it is my 
responsibility, as I have said many times in the past, to consult my people on the future 
course of our freedom struggle”64   
Tibetan parliament in exile came out with a proposal of four-point referendum to 
debate and vote for their future course of action. Four points were: 1) Middle Path, 2) 
Independence 3) Self Determination and 4) Satyagraha (Insistence on truth). The government 
in exile finalized the voting period for August 1996. The next two years NGOs and members 
of Tibetan parliament took an active role in educating the mass about four options through 
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meetings, seminars, discussions and workshops within the exile community. Finally, Tibetan 
intellectuals and TYC led a campaign calling for the withdrawal of referendum as they felt 
time has not ripe and conducive for it.  
The exile government later conducted an opinion poll within the Tibetan community 
where over 64% said, “no” to the referendum stating that people of Tibet have full faith in 
Dalai Lama and whatever path he may choose to find a solution, they will respect and support 
it wholeheartedly. That result Parliament in exile to pass a resolution that once again led to 
the continuation of middle way path to resolve Tibetan problem.
65
  Since then, the Tibetan 
official’s solution to the resolution of Tibetan issue is through middle way approach. The 
peaceful approach taken by Dalai Lama received support, not only from the West, but also 
from some Chinese intellectuals from the mainland.  
2.3.1.1 CTA’s Middle Way Approach 
The genesis of the Middle Way Approach is a gradual process rather than a suddenly 
evolved. After reaching exile India, for some time the Dalai Lama and his exile Tibetan 
government held a policy of restoring Tibet’s lost freedom. But with the passage of time, 
realizing the importance of adopting a policy parallel to the prevailing international and 
domestic situation in China, a series of serious discussion were held within the decision 
making of Tibetan government in exile. In 1974, the course of Tibetan struggle was initiated 
to work toward the realization of meaningful autonomy of all Tibetan belonging to the three 
traditional provinces (Dotoe, Domey and Utsang). This effort on the part of the Tibetan to 
seek a modus Vivendi with the Chinese government has later become popular across the 
globe as the ‘Middle Way Policy”  
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The Exile Tibetan’s Middle Way Approach realize the cause of Tibet is neither it 
seeks the separation of Tibet from China nor accepts the present conditions of Tibet under the 
People’s Republic of China. Therefore, the policy framed in an effort to resolve the problem 
in a manner that benefits both the parties concerned, it treads a middle path between these 
two extremes. In the outline of the middle way approach, the Tibetan part seeks to resolve the 
problem of Tibet towards securing a genuine autonomy within the constitutional framework 
of the People’s Republic of China. It says, ‘ for resolving the issue of Tibet, each and every 
provision of  autonomy as stipulated in the Constitution of the Peoples Republic of China and 
its Law on National Regional Autonomy should be genuinely implemented by the  Chinese 
government, and the entire Tibetan people must bring under a single autonomous 
administration.’66  
In the Sino-Tibetan dialogue process that took place between 1979 till 1988, the 
Tibetan part made a broad outline of the autonomous status but no details of autonomy 
explained. However in the Strasbourg proposal of 1988, they strived for a self government 
democratic political entity that comprised of three regions of Tibet founded on a separate 
fundamental law of its own. But it was constantly rejected by the Chinese government saying 
it demanded independence, semi independence or independence in disguise’. Chinese 
government has responded at different times that there is no way for them to hold talk on the 
Strasbourg proposal. Consequently on his 10th March of 1992, the Dalai Lama declared that 
the Strasbourg proposal as having become null and void through this annual 10 March 
statement and address at the Yale university. USA 
After years of political stalemate, the resumption of direct contact in 2002 achieved no 
significant outcome in the Sino Tibetan engagement due to a widespread peaceful protest all 
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over Tibet in 2008. On 1st July 2008, during the seventh round of talks in Beijing, the 
Minister of the Central United Front Work Department (UFWD), Mr. Du Qinglin explicitly 
invited the suggestion from the Dalai Lama for stability and development of Tibet. The 
Executive vice Minister of the UFWD, Mr. Zhu Weiqun, further said they would like to hear 
the view on the degree or form of autonomy the Tibetan part seeking as on all aspect of 
regional autonomy within the scopes of the constitution of the PRC.  
The exile Tibetan delegation submitted the ‘memorandum on the Genuine Autonomy 
for Tibetan People’67  at Chinese government’s consideration with a detailed explanation how 
the national regional autonomy provision enshrined in the Constitution of the People’s 
Republic China could implement for all Tibetans.  However, the Chinese side maintained that 
the Memorandum contravenes the Constitution of the PRC as well as the three adherence as 
the proposal is a tactical initiative to advance the Dalai Lama’s hidden agenda of 
independence. In response, the Tibetan part presented a note on the memorandum of Genuine 
Autonomy for the Tibetan People
68
 rectifying the misconception of the memorandum that 
Chinese leaders expressed. The note states that the Tibetan people’s aspiration as set out in 
the memorandum can meet within the framework and spirit of PRC’s constitution and its 
principles of autonomy and that these proposal does not contravene and challenge the ‘three 
adherence.’69   
To conclude, the five rounds of talks between Dharamsala and the Beijing 
commenced from September 2002 till December 2006 have not focused on the basic question 
of status of Tibet but appear to be a public relations exercise. However, according to Lodi 
Gyaltsen Gyari, Special envoy of Dalai Lama in an optimist’s state, “These have brought us 
                                                          
67 DIIR. op. cit., p.21 
68 DIIR, Note on the Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan People, 2008 DIIR Publication  
69 Ibid.  P. 42 
  48             
to a new level. Today, there is a deeper understanding of each other’s position and 
recognition of where the fundamental difference is.”70   
2.3.2 PRC’s new economic policy in Tibet  
China’s new economic policy of opening Tibet towards a market economy did 
emphasis on bringing growth and economic development  in Tibet, yet its economic interests 
are closely link to political one. The economic reform was solely intended to accelerate its 
political integration with China and, therefore; it was government by the narrow vision of 
bringing materialist development in Tibet. In the process of opening Tibet, a growing 
emphasis on development of technical and financial sector brought influx of expert and 
technically skilled migrant to run an expanding business, pushed the Tibetans further down in 
the ladder of competition in manual and semiskilled jobs. This problem was further 
compounded by the fact that a majority of Tibetans remained in rural areas, lacking basic 
amenities and access to the benefits brought by the new economic policy.
71
  
Parallel to the opening Tibet towards the market economy, China opened the first 
Tibet stock exchange in Lhasa in 1994, this does attract a huge amount of money into the area 
but failed to bring any benefits to the local Tibetan. Further, it created suspicion among the 
Tibetan for the influx for Chinese migrant in their area, which ultimately becomes the main 
problem of conflict. Since the economic policy aimed at bringing materialist development in 
Tibet but it failed to address the social and political grievances of the Tibetan people. 
Therefore, the redirection of policy of economic integration neither lessens the 
discontentment of Tibetan People nor the existing conflict between the two communities.
72
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China’s economic reform in Tibet was commendable, but it is clear to state that there 
was much disparity in the forms of development China made in Lhasa. In an interview with a 
Tibetan refugee in Dharamsala who fled from Tibet in year 2005, he says, ‘I have seen 
myself at Lhasa in 2003 with two distinct societies. One developed and prosperous which has 
taken advantage of infrastructure and tourism boom where one sees only Hans in this part of 
the city and Tibetans are only selling their merchandise on the footpaths. The other part is 
Tibetan society, like in Jorkhang Monastery area, who has missed the race of economic 
development and opportunities.’73   
Many Chinese officials maintain that China’s security in Tibet cannot be trusted to 
Tibetans as they would exploit autonomy to revive Tibetan nationalism. To harness their 
control in the Tibetan area, they armed themselves with the policy of assimilation and 
development in Tibet. They believe that if Tibetans significantly outnumbered in their own 
country, the separatists’ elements would be hard pressed to stage a rebellion against the 
Communist party. The 4000 km long Beijing – Lhasa railway project at the cost of US 3 
Billion realized for that purpose.  
Beyond its attempt in solving Tibet issue with its economic policy, China also plays 
her game at the global arena by setting its economic parameters against securing stability 
under its core foreign policy. Therefore, whoever does business with China, it is necessary to 
respect Five Principles of Coexistence that forms basic foreign policy of China, and she takes 
every action against who either opposes state or jeopardizing either its stability or 
development. China reckons that Tibet is not sufficiently important issue for the west to put 
its economic interest at risk by the promise of trade and economic benefit. Hence she was 
able to defuse western criticism and maintain its overall policy in further integration of Tibet 
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with China by the means of institutional reforms and rapid growth of market oriented 
economy.  
Besides China’s primary objective for integrating Tibet towards a market economy, 
the second thrust of the policy is projected to counter the separatist activities and instigate a 
campaign to root out Tibetan nationalist, as the major cause of instability in Tibet. Another 
central aspect of the campaign was against the Dalai Lama. As per the opinions of many 
senior leaders in China’s communist party, they believe that the question of Tibet an 
essentially an issue about the Dalai Lama and this view yields a new strategy to eliminate 
both his religious and political power from the area.
74
    
To counter the Dalai Lama’s international power, China’s objects any nation meeting 
with the Dalai Lama and assert that any countries who meet with Dalai Lama seen as 
undermining China’s national integrity. In September 2007, Angela Merkel met Dalai Lama 
in Berlin and addressed China’s human rights records and lack of rule of law. Immediately 
China cancelled series of high-level meetings and incorporated it into its diplomacy.
75
  Two 
months later when the newly elected French President Sarkozy paid his first state visit to 
China, unlike Merkel, Sarkozy remained silent on these issues and came back with the 
contract worth 20 billion euros.
76
  
According to the research undertaken by Andreas Fuchs and Nils-Hendrik Klann,
77
  it 
shows a tremendous financial implication for the world leader’s meeting with the Dalai 
Lama. The research indicates that there were higher trade reductions when head of the state 
meet with Dalai Lama compare to lower – ranking officials. Though International outrage 
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over Tiananmen still could stand together as a broad coalition of parties to rebuke china's 
behavior, but when the trade becomes dearer during the economic crisis, the leaders of the 
Western nations toned down the Tibetan issue or meetings with Dalai Lama.   
In the event of two parties’ tactical strategy and diplomatic game plan, an aura of 
political stalemate cast over the Sino Tibetan engagement. PRC’s unsuccessful new economic 
policy to address the grievances of the Tibetan people sparked a row of protest and riots in 
Tibet followed by its strike hard campaign widen the confrontation between the two parties. 
Furthermore, China’s imposition of precondition78 put exile Tibetans towards a dilemmatic 
situation whereby it weaken the element of Sino-Tibetan dialogue. Finally, the era of 
stalemate was weakened by a view of Chinese to play the game of waiting as they believe 
that the post Dalai Lama would dissipate the resistance and end of Tibet issue. 
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CHAPTER III 
ASPECT OF THE STATIC DIALOGUE & CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
3.1 Security dilemma  
Sixty years witnessed rows of violent conflict and a series of conciliatory attempt by 
both parties to engage in dialogue towards a peaceful solution, yet it brought the Chinese and 
Tibetans no closer to a resolution of their disagreement. In the pursuit of a comprehensive 
view of current Sino Tibetan dialogue, this research establishes the realist theory of the 
security dilemma to demonstrate the hypothesis on the failed engagement. The concept 
illustrates that the world does not have a common government, it is “anarchic”, and survival 
is the main motive of states. States are distrustful of other states' intentions and as a 
consequence always try to maximize their own security; this results in the situation of the 
security dilemma.
79
 
Taking this concept into account, the research argue that conscious of its weakness as 
a state, which has implications for state, regime and national security, China has pursued 
state-building through its policies on religion, language, education and economy in Tibet. 
Considering the fact on China’s fear and insecurity that she perceived as a threat to their state 
building project in Tibet, she consistently rejected a number of Tibetan proposals for 
autonomy and even denied the existence of a ‘Tibet Issue.' Conversely, Tibetan identity 
insecurity generated by the Chinese policies; transfer of influx of Han Chinese in Tibet and 
their cultural influences inside Tibet explains both the Dalai Lama’s unpopular decision to 
give up his erstwhile aspiration for Tibetan independence as well as his steadfast demands for 
autonomy and unification of all Tibetans under one administration. Identity insecurity also 
drives the multi-faceted Tibetan resistance both inside Tibet and in the diasporas.  
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Despite the intentions of both Beijing and the Tibetans to increase their respective 
securities identified above, the result is greater insecurity for both, plunging them into 
dilemmatic cycles of state-building policies by the Chinese sand strengthening of identity and 
resistance on the Tibetan side. This research gives play to a multiplicity of actors, objectives 
and strategies on both sides and examines the feed-back effect that exists between the Sino-
Tibetan conflict and the regional and global political, strategic and ideological competitions. 
China’s current position on the Tibet, maintaining a slow and cautious engagement 
with the exile Tibetans certainly looks like a part of its broader foreign policy aimed at 
protecting the country’s “core interests” (Tibet, Xinjiang, Taiwan, etc.) disallowing any 
compromise on questions concerning national sovereignty.  Inside Tibet, the PRC seems to 
be showing no hesitancy to suppress any fresh unrest through use of force; military and 
police units now deployed in requisite numbers. All monasteries in Tibet are being subjected 
to ‘patriotic education campaign supervised by State Administration for Religious Affairs as 
President Hu Jintao has said “Tibet Buddhism and Socialist society should adapt to each 
other”.80 
For Tibetan, Buddhism has been the central to their life and the 14th Dalai Lama and 
the 10th Panchen Lama were referred as the "sun and moon" of the Tibetan Buddhist 
firmament. They represent the heart of Tibet's Buddhist civilization. Towards their great 
dismay, on 28 January 1989, five days after delivering a blistering criticism of Chinese rule, 
the Panchen Lama was found dead at his monastery. His death followed the reincarnation of 
two Panchen Lamas, one recognized by the Dalai Lama and another appointed by Beijing. 
The Dalai Lama recognized a six year old boy in Tibet, Gedun Chokyi Nyima
81
  as the 
authentic reincarnation of the 10th Panchen Lama in May 1995. China bundled off the boy 
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and his family to Beijing and till now no one knows where he is the state of his mental and 
physical health or that of his education.  In November that year, Beijing appointed Gyaltsen 
Norbu, another six-year-old boy as the 11th Panchen Lama.  
China believes that the Dalai Lama is the ember of fading Tibet issue, in lines with 
their strategic moves and hard-line political campaigns against the Dalai Lama, they play the 
games of wait time till his demise. Meanwhile, China takes a stand that the successor to the 
14th Dalai Lama has to be found within China, apparently with an eye on foreclosing any 
option for the exiled leader to find his successor outside China. With the blessings of Beijing, 
a successor to Panchen Lama has already been found. Beijing’s grooming of its Panchen 
Lama aimed at snatching the ultimate prize of controlling the recognition of the 15th Dalai 
Lama. Since Beijing has already reduced the scope of discussion of Tibet issue only to the 
terms of the Dalai Lama’s return, the only avenue for negotiations is one between Beijing and 
the Dalai Lama over his personal status.
82
  Therefore, Beijing perceives that once the present 
Dalai Lama dies, their battle for the state building project will be settled once and for all.  
Having discussed the historical context of the Sino Tibetan dialogue in the previous 
two chapters, turning to the specifics of the recent and contemporary Sino-Tibetan encounter 
with an analytical focus on the post 1989 period. It examines the dynamic interplay of the 
mutual insecurities of the Chinese Party State and the Tibetan nation through the transmission 
belt of China’s Tibet policy. The first section would illustrate the various Chinese policies 
and instruments deployed towards the Tibetans after 1989 in the pursuit of their state-
building Next, the insecurity faced by the Tibetan people in Tibet and diasporas— a brief 
outline of their resistance and strategies which drive Beijing’s Tibet policy will study in a 
more coherent manner. A cyclical dynamics and impact of the insecurity dilemma between 
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Chinese state building and Tibetan resistance on the Sino Tibetan dialogue will be given at 
appropriate places in the later part of this chapter. 
3.2. China’s Game Plan  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, in response to the pro-independence 
demonstrations and riots Tibet, Wu Jinghua, the liberal Yi minority Party Secretary of TAR, 
was replaced by Hu Jintao on 12 January, which developed by Hu’s martial law in Lhasa on 7 
March, 1989.  Due to a number of reasons discussed in the previous chapter, a Politburo 
meeting in Beijing unveiled on 19 October, 1989, the hard line policy of rejecting political 
liberalization, repressive enforcement of stability and rapid economic growth inside Tibet and 
the side-lining the Dalai Lama. It reflected a loss of faith in the liberal policies of the Hu 
Yaobang and Wu Jinghua to win Tibetan loyalty. In fact, they were seen as increasing 
nationalistic sentiments, leading to ethnic riots.  
China’s Tibet policy in the 1990s and the first decade of the 21st century adhered 
closely to the broad parameters of coercive stabilization, rapid economic development and 
political, ideological campaigns. A number of different policy instruments have been used to 
achieve a political, military and societal security objectives of nation and state-building. 
Introduced at different historical junctures since the incorporation of the Tibetan regions into 
the PRC, all these instruments predated the policy-shift in 1989. However, the instruments 
that most defined Beijing’s Tibet policy after 1989 have been its reliance on the coercive 
forces (PLA, PAP, PSB and police and the wider surveillance apparatus), economic 
development, political campaigns and the United Front. 
83
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China’s security concerns in Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia involve fears over 
sovereignty, territorial integrity, legitimacy, organizing ideology, the Leninist political 
system and state institutions, national identity and image and regime survival. Zhang Qingli, 
former Party Secretary of TAR, clearly reveals Tibet’s importance for China’s security: 
Tibet’s strategic position is crucial; it is an important security screen in China’s 
southwest. Tibet’s unique features in history, the current state, environment, and 
geography determine that its development and stability are always closely linked to 
national sovereignty and security. Tibet is a focal point in our struggle with 
international anti-China forces. The desire of hostile forces to finish us is still alive, 
their desire to throw us into chaos, has not changed, and they have all along tried to 
make use of the so-called Tibet question to contain and split China. Supported by 
international anti-China forces, the Dalai clique has continually changed its methods, 
frequently caused incidents, damaged social stability, and plotted so-called Tibet 
independence.... Our struggle against the Dalai clique and the western hostile forces 
supporting it is long term, sharp, intense and complex.
84
  
Having being discussed earlier, the Second Tibet Work Forum in 1984 made 
economic development the foundation of Beijing’s Tibet policy ‘to get rich as soon as 
possible’ was the slogan. Hu Jintao had also arrived with a programme of investment and 
commodity market expansion in Tibet.
85
  However, economic development was explicitly 
associated with security agenda, raising standard of living as a way to dilute Tibetan 
nationalism. Chen Kuiyen, then TAR Party Secretary strongly believes that the economics are 
the cure against Tibetan nationalism. He said in Chamdo:   
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Only with economic development and improvement or prestige of the country and 
with people getting rich and tired of splittist groups can they finally make correct 
judgments and give up their purpose of splitting the country. If the economy develops 
well, the spiritual civilization will find a solid ground, and long-term stability within 
Tibet will be based on very reliable and solid ground. With economic development 
their confidence in the country will be greatly increased, and the trend of unification 
and loving the central government will be enhanced.
86
  
He added that the Economic backwardness has made the Tibetans breakdown to their 
religious illusion and strengthened their splittist ideas. Chen’s views were entirely in sync 
with the prevailing attitude of Beijing as the outcome of the Third Tibet Work Forum 
demonstrated. Chinese officials and scholars have openly confirmed that security 
considerations were central to the inception and implementation of development strategy in 
Tibet.  The policy of ‘grasping with two hands’ with emphasis on economic development and 
political repression extended during the Fourth Tibet Work Forum held in Beijing from 25th 
to 27th June, 2001. Jiang Zemin identified two major issues to resolved in his speech, the first 
one is to accelerate development and the tasks relating to economic and social development 
remain arduous. The second issue is to promote stability.’87  He was clear about the security 
rationale, as he said, “[T]he development, stability and safety of Tibet is related to the 
strategic implementation of great western expansion, to national unity and social stability, to 
the unification and security of the motherland, and to our national image and international 
struggle”.88  
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Development, stability and security were also the central themes in the Fifth Tibet 
Work Forum held in Beijing in January 2010 calling Tibet a ‘special contradiction’ with 
relevance to national unity, social stability, national security and foreign relations. President 
Hu Jintao said, ‘the theme of the work of Tibet must be the promotion of development by 
leaps and bounds and long-term stability.’89  It is clear that the economic development has 
been the centre-piece of China’s Tibet policy throughout the post-Mao period. 
Unsurprisingly, Beijing invokes economic growth as the main legitimizing factor in its rule 
over Tibet. 
Over the past decade, large-scale political protests have disappeared, and the 
occasional isolated incidents of unrest have swiftly crushed. The economy of the TAR is now 
growing at double digit rates, and there are visible signs of affluence in urban centers. TAR’s 
GDP increased from 91.18 million RMB in 1998 to 138.73 million RMB in 2001 with an 
annual growth rate of 17.4%.
90
  In 2007, TAR’s GDP was 34.22 billion RMB with a growth 
rate of 14% over the previous year.
91
  It is admirable to concede for the growth of Tibet’s 
Economy, yet it is equally important to look beneath those statistics as TAR’s economy is so 
heavily and increasingly dependent upon subsidies from Beijing.  
Taking into account the actual transfer of subsidies from Beijing into Tibet, some 
Chinese economists have dubbed it ‘blood-transfusion economy.92  By the mid 1990s, the 
rate of subsidization was around 45% of TAR’s GDP, rose to 71% in 2001 and almost 75% in 
2003.
93
  Hence, the main source of the sparkling GDP growth in TAR is direct subsidies from 
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the Centre and government spending. Government officials and Chinese nationalists make 
much of these subsidies, but contrary those high levels of subsidies bolster inefficiencies for 
long-term growth prospects. In fact, most of government spending in TAR goes towards 
capital construction and state administration, including a large portion for the internal 
security apparatus, and less towards education, health and agriculture, relative to national 
spending on these sectors.
94
  In 2001, 33.3% of government expenditure in TAR went 
towards infrastructure-building such as the Qinghai-Tibet Railway where as 14% to 
government administration and only 8.5% to education, compared to the national figures of 
12.5%, 9% and 15.5% respectively.
95
  Therefore, these spending priorities apparently foster 
the perception that Beijing is more interested in controlling Tibet than improving the 
conditions of the Tibetans. With Tibet effectively under control and with the multibillion 
dollar, Great Western Development campaign now well underway, many Chinese question 
why the Chinese authorities would even choose to renew direct contacts with the Dalai Lama. 
Besides the wider part of its stability measure of rapid economic development 
established in Tibet, Beijing always has included a social component to maintain its 
stronghold in Tibet. The period following Cultural Revolution of 1978 was more relaxed as it 
favored the revival of Tibetan Buddhism in all Tibetan areas, especially in Kham and Amdo 
where the Tibetans enjoyed more religious freedom. However, the revival revealed the 
intense devotion that most Tibetans still felt towards the Dalai Lama. Between year 1987 and 
1993, monks and nuns led many pro independence demonstrations in Lhasa in support of the 
Dalai Lama.
96
  Deteriorated by the air of confrontation between Beijing and the Dalai Lama 
over the reincarnation of the 10th Panchen Lama,  in 1995 Beijing unleashed a series of 
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campaigns against the Dalai Lama, banning his photographs and requiring monks, nuns and 
lay Tibetans to criticize him, which continues to fire unrest in several Tibetan regions.  
For China, the Tibetan culture, especially as it relates to Tibetan Buddhism is seen as 
the basis of Tibetan nationalism and security threat to China. To combat what Chinese calls 
the ‘Dalai clique’ abroad and the domestic ‘separatists’ in Tibet, Beijing subjected the 
Tibetans to a number of political campaigns, especially beginning in the mid-1990s. 
Therefore, State-sponsored mass political campaigns have been recurrent features of Chinese 
politics since 1949, and these campaigns invariably assume ethnic dimensions in minority 
regions. Patriotic Education Campaigns Strike Hard Campaigns, Spiritual Civilization 
Campaigns and the anti-Dalai Lama Campaign and have been conducted continuously since 
the mid-1990s. 
As Smith writes, ‘In Tibet, the purpose of the campaign was to transform Tibetan 
national identity into Chinese identity, to eradicate Tibetans’ loyalty to the Dalai Lama, and 
to cultivate Tibetan loyalty to China instead.’ 97   The nation-building and state-building 
objectives are apparent. Patriotic Education Campaign was initially carried all over China 
after the Tiananmen Square massacre. It ‘represented a state-led effort to rebuild the 
legitimacy of the CCP. Two dominant themes of the campaign were Han Chinese tradition 
and history especially of the CCP and its achievements and national unity and territorial 
integrity.
98
  In Tibet, when the campaign was first launched in 1996, monks and nuns were 
special targets because of the centrality of religion to Tibetan national identity. The main 
goals of the campaign in Tibet have been to undermine the influence of the Dalai Lama, teach 
the Chinese version of Tibet’s history to the Tibetans, and to promote atheism and materialist 
values to control Tibetan Buddhism and undermine Tibetan traditions. It is clear from the 
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study materials and regulations issued by Chinese government offices.
99
  Party and 
government cadres in the TAR have also been targeted for education, they are prohibited 
from visiting monasteries or demonstrating religious faith, such as taking religious objects to 
work, and taking part in religious festivals.
100
  In 1998 and 2000, Tibetan cadres were told to 
withdraw their children from Tibetan exile schools or lose their jobs and pension so that they 
will not corrupted with separatist thoughts.
101
  
According to the Article 11 of Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law of PRC, “The 
autonomous agencies in ethnic autonomous areas guarantee the freedom of religious belief to 
citizens of the different nationalities. No state organ, public organization or individual may 
compel citizens to believe or not to believe in any religion and guarantees state protection of 
‘normal religious practices.’102  China has put increasing restrictions on Tibetan Buddhism in 
all Tibetan regions. PRC under Chen Kuiyen, then TAR Party Secretary enforced its political 
campaign marks the assault against the Tibetan culture and religion.  Chen made his 
intentions clear when he wrote to Beijing in 1994:  
The continuous expansion of temples and Buddhist monks and nuns should be 
contained. We shall not allow religion to be used by the Dalai clique as a tool for their 
splittist activities. This is an outstanding and key issue concerning party construction 
in Tibet. Under the precondition that we shall rely on education, we shall also take 
some forceful measures to stop this perverse trend. 
The intensity of PRC’s restriction over Tibetan culture and religion has been clear by 
several instances, two high ranking lamas the Karmapa and Arjia Rinpoche escaped into exile 
                                                          
99 Smith, Warren. China’s Policy on Tibetan Autonomy, Washington DC: East West Centre Washington, 2004. 
100 ICT 2004: 52-53. 
101 TIN, 'Campaign against the Dalai Lama Strengthened in Tibet,' 13 November, 1998; TIN, 'Religious Crackdown Intensifies in Lhasa,' 25 
August, 2000. 
102 Laws on Regional National Autonomy of PRC. Available at: http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/13/content_1383908.htm 
Accessed on 12th march, 2014 
 
  62             
due to the continuing restrictions on religious study and practice and the requirements to 
criticize the Dalai Lama and legitimize the Chinese appointed Panchen Lama.
103
   Moreover, 
the demolitions of the statues of Indian saint Padmasambhava in Samye, in 2007 and 
imposition of ‘Order No. 5 ,' a regulation essentially prohibiting Tibetan lamas from 
reincarnating without prior approval from the Chinese government o18 July, 2007 n clearly 
indicate that Beijing has the selection of the next Dalai Lama in mind,
104
 inflaming Tibetan 
resentment.  
The Chinese government knows that the more people believe in the Buddha, the more 
those people will respect the Dalai Lama, it is a threat to the government’s idea of unity if 
either Tibetans or Chinese believes in the Buddha. PRC, therefore, contend any act that 
questions its sovereignty over Tibet, the death sentence later commuted to life imprisonment 
of Tenzin Deleg Rinpoche, another popular reincarnate Lama on allegations of 
masterminding a series of bomb-blasts in Chengdu is another illustration. The common 
thread in all these cases is that the CCP and the government sensed rival power-centres with 
local and national dimensions. So fear has prompted the repression of Tibetan Buddhism at 
the slightest sign of threat to the Party-State. Kapstein captures Beijing’s dilemma with 
regard to its policy on Tibetan Buddhism: 
[B]y suppressing Tibetan Buddhism, Tibetan resentment and hence the longing for 
freedom are increased; but by adopting a liberal policy, the very cultural system that 
most encourages the Tibetans to identify themselves apart from China continues to 
flourish.
105
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According to a White Paper on Tibetan culture claims that the TAR government ‘has 
paid great attention to maintaining and safeguarding the Tibetan people's right to study, use 
and develop their spoken and written language.’106  The right to use and develop the spoken 
and written languages of the nationalities is provided in the Constitution and Autonomy Law, 
yet the Tibetan language also fell victim to the hardening PRC policy regime. One Western 
scholar deplored that ‘maintaining and improving Tibetan language education is proving to 
be a difficult uphill struggle.’107  The privileging of Mandarin Chinese in education and 
public life undermined the place of Tibetan language in Tibet. In 2010, a Chinese government 
decision to replace Tibetan language by Chinese as a medium of instruction in schools led to 
massive protests by thousands of Tibetan students in Chentsa County.
108
  
By reflecting to the most recent incidents in Tibet, the Chinese authorities in Muge 
Norwa town in Zungchu County, Ngaba prefecture, have forced the organizers of a Tibetan 
language contest Drime and Lodroe Gyaltsen to cancel their event saying it had “political 
implications”.109  Since in the language contest the participants were required to speak pure 
Tibetan free of Chinese or any other language in the contest that was scheduled for February 
21st 2014 observed worldwide as the International Mother Language Day.  The event  
announced, and preparations had been made; however, the Chinese authorities told them the 
Tibetan language contained words that could be used to express opposition to Chinese rule. 
So they were ordered to cancel the event and were warned they would face serious 
consequences if they did not comply. Furthermore, the Chinese government has come down 
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heavily on Tibetan language rights by imprisoning several writers and poets writing in 
Tibetan language.  
3.3 Identity insecurity and the Tibetan resistance 
In the previous section, we examined the links between Chinese insecurities and the 
post 1989 policies in Tibet with a detailed explanation of the Chinese insecurities challenges 
in relation to Tibet and external enemies – the Dalai Lama and Exile Tibetans. This section 
will provide an exhaustive account of the Tibetan identity insecurity created by the Chinese 
policies and practices examined in terms of three converging sources of assimilationist state 
policies, migration and cultural imperialism. Besides providing a grief implication of PRC’s 
state policy spurring the identity insecurity to the Tibetans, the section also provides a brief 
and exclusive analysis of Tibetan resistance and discontentment towards the existing Chinese 
policy regime pertaining to restrict oneself within the boundary of this discourse. Finally, we 
would focus on how Tibetan strategies and activities heighten the sense of the security 
challenges for Beijing and its policy implications, thereby completing the cycle of the 
insecurity dilemma. 
The concept of societal security is employed here to explain the Tibetan identity 
insecurity as identified. Like state security is about sovereignty where national identity is the 
main referent object, societal security is about identity. The societal insecurity develops when 
a group defines a particular development or potentiality as a threat to its identity and survival 
as a distinct community. The threats perceived by members of that group fall into three 
analytically distinct themes of vertical assimilationist state policies, migration and 
horizontally homogenizing cultural imperialism. As the Copenhagen School posits, these 
threats range from ‘intentional, programmatic and political...to unintended and structural.’110 
                                                          
110 Rabgey and Sharlho 2004: 33 
  65             
The Dalai Lama often complains that Tibetan culture faces threats from ‘intentional’ state 
policies and practices and unintentional socio-economic consequences of these policies.
111
  In 
his 10 March, 2008 address on the anniversary of the 1959 Lhasa uprising, the Dalai Lama 
said: 
As a result of their policy of population transfer, the non-Tibetan population has   
increased many times, reducing native Tibetans to an insignificant minority in their 
own country. Moreover, the language, customs and traditions of Tibet, which reflect 
the true nature and identity of the Tibetan people, are gradually fading away. As a 
consequence, Tibetans are increasingly being assimilated into the larger Chinese 
population.
112
  
He accuses the Chinese government of conducting ‘cultural genocide’ in Tibet by 
means of both assimilationist policies and unintended structural and socio-economic 
consequences.
113
  This fear for Tibetan identity is shared by most Tibetans inside Tibet as 
Germano seen a ‘deep, abiding cultural depression among the educated youth and religious 
elite to nomads and villagers.’114  Tibetans deplore that their religious and intellectual as well 
as political situation is hopeless, given the continuing Chinese social and political 
onslaught.
115
  For most Tibetans inside and outside Tibet, survival and protection of their 
national identity has become the core objective of their struggle. 
With PRC’s economic development policy coupled by the infrastructure building, 
especially in the transportation section enabled the migration of Han and Hui Chinese into 
TAR through a conscious policy decision during the Second Tibet Work Forum in 1984. 
Tibetans both inside and outside Tibet consider Chinese immigration as a grave threat to 
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Tibetan identity
116
 as the Dalai Lama raised fears of Chinese plan to resettle one million 
Chinese in TAR after the Beijing Olympics.
117
  The migration of Chinese into Tibet is the 
result of a combination of state policy41 and voluntary migration, as many of Han and Hui 
Chinese migrate into Tibet to take advantage of the economic opportunities opened up by 
Beijing’s investment in Tibet. But for Tibetans, they see the increasing number of Chinese, 
favored by the policies of privileging Mandarin Chinese in education and public life as 
threatening to the very Tibetan identity. 
The Tibetans see in China’s modernization and development in Tibet a colonial 
project to exploit Tibetan resources and ‘civilize’ the Tibetans by undermining their religion, 
language and customs.
118
 Hence, one of Tibetan NGO in exile saw the infrastructure building 
and railway as ‘a tool of cultural genocide.’119  Another influential organization ICT  blamed 
the Railway for bringing about a “second invasion” of Tibet by accelerating the influx of 
Chinese’ and endangering Tibet’s culture and religion, which is integral to Tibetan 
identity.
120
  Woeser, a Tibetan activist, blogger, poet and essayist in Tibet, expressed in an 
essay on the Railway: ‘Regrettably, violence of various degrees—hard, soft and in-between 
prevails in the vast land of Tibet, and all of it bears the standard of development and in the 
name of modernization works its impact on the senses and hearts of the people.’121  
The Mass migration of Chinese settlers into Lhasa and other areas in the Tibet 
Autonomous Region (TAR) exacerbated by economic reforms, especially since 1992 not only 
reduces the Tibetans to a minority in their own country, but changed the physical 
characteristics of the places where they settle, constantly reminding Tibetans of the 
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vulnerability of their identity. Through official permission or selling rights to Chinese 
property developers, many traditional parts of Lhasa were knocked down, and contemporary 
Chinese style houses built. Street signs and business names written in bold Chinese characters 
with barely visible Tibetan characters. Woeser decried the ‘ugly construction’ taking place in 
Tibetan cities, where once traditional Tibetan architecture was prevalent.
122
  She also 
deplored the visibly Chinese appearance of Lhasa during Tibetan New Year, complete with 
Chinese style lanterns everywhere.
123
  Due to the state’s ownership and control of the 
vehicles of cultural production, propagation and transmission including the media and 
communications infrastructure and public education coupled with Chinese immigration, 
Tibetans feel that the onslaught of Chinese culture is gradually undermining Tibetan identity.  
The anxiety of Tibetan people for their identity insecurity is clear from Tibetan 
language blogs, literary magazines and general media emerging from Tibet.
124
 The case of 
Kartze TAP in Sichuan is illustrative of the outcome of these pressures on Tibetan identity. 
Derong Tsering Dhondup, a Tibetan official and intellectual from Kartze, carried out an 
investigation of 6,044 Tibetan cadres in the Karze (Ch. Ganzi) Tibetan Autonomous 
Prefecture and found that Only 991 cadres, 16.4% of the total knew the Tibetan written 
language. In Kanding it was 3.1%, Bathang 5.3%, Lithang 9.9%, Ganzi 21.6%, Xinlong 
9.5%, Derge 38.7%, Baiyu [Palyul] 13.2%, Serxu 30.7% and Serta 15%.9. He also carried 
out an investigation involving 25 Tibetan students at the Middle School in Kangding (Tib. 
Dhartse amdo) and found that 5 of them, ie., 20%, could make fluent conversation in the 
Tibetan language for any occasion; 4 people, ie., 16%, could only make conversation in 
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Tibetan for ordinary occasions; 9 people (36%) could understand Tibetan language but could 
only speak it for everyday use; and 7 people (28%) could understand it but could not even 
speak in Tibetan for everyday use.
125
  Dhondup deplore that the ‘rich, fine language and 
literature’ of Tibet will disappear in a generation.126  He attributes this state of affairs to first 
to the mistaken idea of speeding up the fusion of nationalities and secondly for the erroneous 
view that there is “no use for the written Tibetan language and finally the lack of self-respect 
and pride amongst Tibetans.’127   
Another illustration of ‘cultural violence’ is a requirement for Tibetan newsreaders 
and TV personalities to go to China for ‘modern’ voice coaching in how to speak Tibetan 
language.
128
 Tibetans are fearful that because of the official policies and greater freedom of 
cultural expression of the Han Chinese and the climate of fear, Tibetan culture will lose out 
gradually in a cultural war of attrition. Pragmatic and materialist pressures could also hasten 
the process as some Tibetan families send their children to Chinese language schools at the 
expense of Tibetan language education because they see that as the only way they can have 
better futures.
129
  The feeling that there is no use for Tibetan language compels some Tibetan 
parents to privilege Chinese language education for their children. The lack of self-respect 
makes some Tibetans, especially the young and impressionable ones, to speak the language 
of their ‘colonial’ rulers.130   
Finally, the most important instrument which Beijing deployed to undermine Tibet’s 
identity has been laid under implementation of the Regional National Autonomy. The key 
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128 Dodin 2008: 200. 
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positions of power are held by Han Chinese, with all the decision and policy campaigns were 
enforced.
131
  An official publication of TGIE argues: 
Tibetans have little or no say in running their own affairs. The Chinese Communist 
Party takes all the decisions of the administration through its Regional CCP....Tibetan 
people's participation in the government is only to rubber stamp Communist Party 
decisions. Tibetans on the plateau does not hold any key positions—even within the 
"TAR" Communist Party. The Secretary of the "TAR" Communist Party is the most 
powerful position in the "TAR" and Chinese has held this post since 1959....The 
people of half of Tibet—living in eastern regions now merged into neighboring 
Chinese provinces—are completely deprived of their political identity and labeled an 
insignificant minority nationality in their own land.
132
  
Tibetans argue that the division of Tibetans into separate nominally autonomous 
prefectures, counties and Tibetan Autonomous Regional TAR has ‘contributed to the 
weakening and erosion of the Tibetan nationality's unique identity and features, as well as its 
ability to grow and develop.’133 When the NPC passed the law on regional autonomy in May 
1984, the Tibetans in Tibet dismissed it as ‘thunder that does not bring any rain’ because of 
the different obstacles identified in the previous chapter.17 Phunwang characterised Beijing’s 
existing policy in Tibet as ‘assimilationist’18 and endorsed the Dalai Lama’s demand for 
meaningful autonomy for all Tibetans under one administration.
134
  In short, the Tibetans 
view both the level and design of autonomy as hostile to the significant expression and 
reproduction of Tibetan identity. It is consistent with the observations of scholars, such as 
Moseley, Zhao and Smith, who described RNA as ‘regional detention,’ an instrument for 
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serving the Party-State’s security interests rather than Tibetan [Uighur or Mongol] interests 
and identity.  
However not all Tibetan regions have reached the dire situation described by Derong 
in Kartze TAP above, current popular media such as songs and blogs from inside Tibet 
littered with expressions of fear of Tibetan identity generally.
135
  It was in the context of such 
identity insecurity and anomie arising from powerlessness in the face of ‘hostile’ Chinese 
policies that the Tibetan uprising in March 2008 swept the entire Tibetan plateau. According 
to a report by International Campaign for Tibet, protests have been reported in each of 52 
county level locations in Tibetan areas of China.
136
 Chinese media reported the violent riot on 
its state media print, online and state owned CCTV. Even Premier Wen Jiabao went on to 
denounce Dalai Lama’s supporters as separatists and accused them of instigating the violence 
in Lhasa.     
The most dramatic form of protest against the Chinese rule took place on February 27, 
2009, at Ngaba county of Sichuan province when a young monk in mid-twenties named 
Tapey set himself on fire as a form of protest after the prayer ceremony at his monastery 
cancelled. While on fire, he raised a homemade Tibetan flag that had a photograph of Dalai 
Lama.
137
 Both items were illegal according to Chinese law. The Chinese security personnel 
immediately shot him down. It was the first time in Tibet where a Tibetan resorted such a 
drastic act of self-immolation as a form of protest.
138
  Since February 27, 2009 until the date 
(June 12, 2013) 133 Tibetans are known to have self-immolated in Tibet. Due to Chinese 
                                                          
135 A short sample of songs expressing Tibetan identity pride and fears include: དཀུན་དགའ་ཕུན་ཚགོས་ཀ་ི ༼ཡིིད་རེ་ྐྱོོ་།   དང་  & དིན་ལན་། [Kunga Phuntsok’s 
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‘Divine Bird Gong-mo’]; སོལ་མ་ྐྱོབས་ཀི་ཡགངས་ཅན་པ་།  [Dolma Kyab’s ‘Tibetan’]; ཤེར་བསྟན་ག་ིཡལས་དབང་།   དང་ ཡཉི་ཟླ་སྐར་གསུམ་།   དང་  ཡཞི་བདེའ་ིལྷ་བྱ་དཀར་པོ་། [Sherten’s 
‘Destiny’, ‘The Sun, Moon and Stars’ and ‘Divine White Bird of Peace’]; All the music videos associated with these songs can be viewed on 
Youtube 
136 Report by International Campaign for Tibet: Tibet at a turning point :The Spring Uprising and China’s New Crackdown, ICT, 
Washington DC 2008, p. 5 
137 Strom in the grasslands: Self-Immolations in Tibet and Chinese policy, A report by ICT, December 10, 2012 p.11 
138 Thupten Ngodup was first Tibetan to self –immolate as a form of protest. Available at:  
http://www.jamyangnorbu.com/blog/2008/05/12/remembering-thupten-ngodup/, accessed on  April20, 2014 
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intensified measures to prevent the outflow of information related to the situation inside 
Tibet, in particularly on self-immolation, it remains impossible to present comprehensive 
figure related to self-immolation. These immolators consist of Tibetans from all three 
province, representing young and old, monks and nuns, rich and nomads, raised slogans or 
left notes and video message calling “freedom in Tibet” and the  “return of Dalai Lama” in 
Tibet. Fewer called for “independence for Tibet” and “unity amongst Tibetans”.139  
As the Dalai Lama said “the root cause for the Tibetan issue lies in Tibet’s long, 
separate history, its distinct and ancient culture, and its unique identity. The issue based on 
non-acceptance of Tibetan as different from Chinese in terms of culture and language. The 
rejection of Tibetan identity and its rich heritage Buddhist culture and destruction through the 
process of sinicization caused the foundation of conflict that still exists today.”140 Lastly in 
the context of dilemmatic cycles of China’s state-building policies and a massive wave of 
Tibetan resistance, the outcome delivered a greater security challenges for Beijing and 
Tibetan part as well. The next section examines the consequences of those identified 
insecurities of both parties on the Sino Tibetan dialogue. 
3.4 Impact of the insecurities over the dialogue 
As a result of dilemmatic security interest, PRC designed its state-building policy in 
Tibet and its diplomacy towards the Dalai Lama and exiled Tibetans so as to protect its 
national sovereignty maintained in the last six decades. The Beijing’s security fear over 
meeting Tibetan demands reversals in the parlance of Beijing’s linear logic of state-building 
and unitary self-image as a state mostly drive its positions towards the Dalai Lama and CTA. 
It is clear from its hard-line position on the Tibet issue, uncompromising responses to 
Dharamsala’s proposals, and its institutional context of policy-making on Tibet. Events in the 
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late 1980s exacerbate Beijing to siege hard line policies in Tibet. Therefore, this section is 
dedicated to discussing the implication of the security dilemma over the Sino Tibetan 
dialogue where it would examine the fall-out on the dialogue between Beijing and 
Dharamsala. 
Throughout the process of Sino Tibetan dialogue since 1979 till today,  on one hand 
Beijing displayed its interest to engage with exiled Tibetan leadership, where on the other 
hand,  it is clear that the Chinese leadership is not interested in a serious dialogue. This was 
apparent with its position and the downplaying of the significance of the delegations by 
calling them “private” and denying knowledge of the visitors’ status as official envoys of the 
Dalai Lama. Furthermore, there have been signs of any change in China’s policies, in Tibet 
coupled with the inflammatory public rhetoric denigrating the Dalai Lama unabated 
throughout the region; they further objected world leaders meeting with the Dalai Lama.  
Analytically even a bitter campaign against the Dalai Lama were taking place in 
Tibet, Beijing did not completely cut off relations with him. This was partly driven by the 
realization of its serious lack of legitimacy among the Tibetans and partly because of the 
frequent mention of Tibet by Western leaders and indeed because of the support from the 
American government in the 1990s. Aside from some of the conciliatory gestures, these 
unpromising developments have led to widespread speculation that the new dialogue 
initiative is no more than a tactical maneuver to blunt international criticism of China’s Tibet 
pocy,  and to keep China’s stability check and balanced from challenging entities, such as 
Tibetan resistance both in Tibet and exile diasporas. 
After nine rounds of talks by February 2010, the two sides are nowhere closer to 
beginning serious negotiations. Despite the liberal opening, Chinese approach to the dialogue 
has been hard-line and rejectionist. First, Beijing’s formal position on Sino-Tibetan dialogue 
  73             
still conforms to the Hu Yaobang’s five-point proposal which dismissed the existence of the 
Tibetan issue and offered to talk only about the Dalai Lama’s return.141  Zhang Qingli, the 
former Party Secretary of TAR, told the German daily Spiegel: ‘The current contacts merely 
involve a few individuals from his immediate surroundings. The talks revolve around his 
personal future.’142   Therefore, even the talks about the Dalai Lama’s return have been 
saddled with preconditions. 
During a televised news conference, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao said: Our policy 
towards the Dalai Lama is explicit and consistent. That is to say, as long as the Dalai Lama 
recognizes that Tibet is an inalienable part of China's territory, that Taiwan is an inalienable 
part of China's territory, and as long as he abandons separatist activities, then we can conduct 
dialogues with him over his personal career.
143
  Perhaps, these public statements are part of 
Beijing’s diplomatic approach but the security concerns weigh heavily on such an 
uncompromising line. The demands put forward by Dharamsala, which are perceived to have 
security implications for the Party-State, to sustain its ‘No Tibet Issue’ position, it is 
necessary to keep refuting the Dalai Lama’s proposals pertaining to the Tibetan interests and 
Tibet’s political status. Commentaries in China’s official press, recycling the same content 
under different authors and titles, dismiss the Dalai Lama’s proposals as negating the PRC 
constitution, being ‘independence in disguise ,' as demanding the withdrawal of the PLA and 
Chinese settlers, and as ‘ethnic cleansing’.  
Because of Beijing’s consistent negative response rejecting the Dalai Lama’s 
proposal, the Tibetan leader had make concessions in series of initiatives and modification in 
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proposals throughout the dialogue process but two demands have remained consistent 
throughout: ‘genuine autonomy’ and unification of all Tibetans under one administration. 
Dharamsala has defined autonomy and unification slightly differently over the recent decades 
to placate Beijing, but Beijing has invariably spurned its overtures, labelling them as 
separatist plots to achieve independence, revive feudalism, theocracy and as ethnic cleansing.  
When the Tibetans asked for Hong Kong-style ‘one country, two systems’ or Special 
Administrative Region (SAR) status in 1982, Beijing rebuffed them saying that unlike Hong 
Kong and Macao, Tibet had already been liberated and enjoyed the socialist economic system 
like China.
144
  Beijing has subsequently repeatedly rejected SAR status for Tibet with that 
same argument and charged that the Dalai Lama is trying to restore ‘feudal serfdom’ and 
seeking a ‘back door route to independence.’145  Next, when the Dalai Lama demanded a 
liberal democratic, internally autonomous Tibet, with foreign affairs and defence in Beijing’s 
hands at Strasbourg (1988) Beijing rejected this outright as ‘independence in disguise’ or 
‘two countries, two systems.’146  Dharamsala’s new post in 2002 formulation of ‘meaningful 
autonomy’ within the framework of the PRC’s Constitution and Autonomy Law, which 
represents important modifications from how autonomy and unification were defined in the 
1980s. Beijing has rejected this too, arguing that the Dalai Lama’s ‘high degree autonomy’ 
seeks to overthrow China's social system, meaning socialism and the CCP.
147
   
As the magnitude and gravity of the situation inside Tibet dramatically has escalated, 
marked by an intensification of the Chinese policy of the cultural assimilation, migration and 
the marginalization of the Tibetan people in their own country generates a greater identity 
insecurity for the Tibetan people, the Dalai Lama and the exile Tibetan leaders had to go 
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through the process of modification of their proposal to meet the urgency of bringing Beijing 
on the negotiation table to address the problems in Tibet. The Dalai Lama said on 10th March 
statement in 1994, “The Chinese government has even refused to enter into negotiations of 
any kind. It has also avoided discussing any question of substance, insisting that the only 
issues to be resolved be those pertaining to my personal return to Tibet. The issue is not about 
my return to Tibet. I have stated this time and again. The issue is the survival of the six 
million Tibetan people along with the protection of our distinct culture, identity and 
civilization.”148 
Dharamsala’s most recent proposal came 15 months after the previous round of 
Dialogue with Beijing. The envoy of the Dalai Lama visited China from January 26 to 31, 
2010 for the ninth round of discussions with representatives of the Chinese leadership in 
Beijing. The Tibetan delegates submitted the proposal for Tibetan autonomy, ‘Memorandum 
on Genuine Autonomy for The Tibetan People’ to the Chinese counterpart. The proposal also 
included “a common effort to study the actual reality on the ground, in the spirit of seeking 
truth from facts [to] help both the sides to move beyond each others’ contentions” and an 
appeal to Beijing to stop mislabeling the Dalai Lama as a “separatist.” It was summarily 
dismissed as a separatist plot as well and also rejected Dharamsala’s demand for unification 
as requiring ‘unconstitutional’ and ‘illegal’ border adjustments and as a plot to ‘eventually 
seeking Tibetan independence.’149  Beijing’s oft-cited justification for rejecting the Dalai 
Lama’s proposals is that the two key demands violate the Chinese constitution, Autonomy 
Law and the socialist political system and threaten China’s sovereignty, territorial integrity 
and national unification.
150
  In short, they are considered as separatist threats to the Party 
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State’s security and control over Tibet. Therefore, Beijing’s rejection of Dharamsala’s 
proposals clearly reveals institutional vulnerability and regime insecurity in Tibet. 
In any case, Beijing’s unyielding stance during the nine rounds of talks between 
September 2002 and February 2010 set CTA as well as general Tibetan populace in position 
of reassessing their course of freedom struggle. A growing number of Tibetans both insides, 
as well as outside Tibet, disagree with the conciliatory approach of the Dalai Lama and exiled 
Tibetan administration not to demand complete independence for Tibet. In 2008, the Dalai 
Lama said that he was losing faith in the Chinese government’s commitment to finding a 
solution and further added “I have now asked the Tibetan government in exile as a true 
democracy in exile, to decide in consultation with the Tibetan people how to take the 
dialogue forward.
151
 " The Dalai Lama sent an unusually strong message to his fellow 
countrymen and called them to take a greater role in deciding the future course of action, 
saying China has failed to respond to his sincere approach. On 10 March, 2010, he said, 
“Judging by the attitude of the present Chinese leadership, there is little hope that the result 
will be achieved soon.’ Unless Beijing makes a dramatically positive gesture, this dialogue 
process appears to be heading towards collapse.” 152 
The protracted stalemate of the current Sino Tibetan dialogue process was intensified 
by the wide range of speculation about the question of the Dalai Lama’s demise. The aging 
spiritual leader's presence and his charismatic approach has kept the course of Tibetan 
struggle under non-violent and under the medium of dialogue, putting a damper on unrest in 
the exile diasporas as well as insides Tibet. However question arises, if he dies, what would 
be the post Dalai Lama era? No doubt, there would be changes in the course of Tibetan 
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struggle and unpredictable wave of protests far greater than 2008. As Khedroob Thondup, 
nephew of the Dalai Lama said that the Dalai Lama has managed to restrain Tibet's youth 
with his message of non-violence.  
The protests in Tibetan plateau communities since February 2009, 133 Tibetans have 
self immolated in Tibet where most of them were Buddhist monks and nuns, seeking a return 
of the exiled Dalai Lama and freedom for Tibet. With an unrest in once quiet areas of the 
Tibetan plateau and little prospect for direct talks between China and the Tibetan government 
in exile, concern is growing that violence will boil over upon the death of the Dalai Lama. If 
nothing changes, Beijing will likely respond with the same tough measures it has used for 
decades. Robbie Barnett, a Tibet expert at Columbia University, said the Dalai Lama's death 
in exile would be so significant to Tibetans it could ruin prospects for a reasonable Tibetan-
Chinese relationship. "If the Dalai Lama dies without any resolution, it will take a half 
century to build trust again,” 153  Therefore in the context of the security dilemma as 
mentioned above the Tibetan people’s identity insecurity under Chinese policy in Tibet and 
PRC’s fear of perceive threat in its state building process and its control in Tibet, essentially 
of Beijing’s strategy – Tibet policy and its diplomacy with the Exile Tibetan leaders exhibit 
the momentum of current Sino Tibetan dialogue. 
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           CHAPTER IV 
THE PROSPECT 
4.1 Introduction 
It is difficult to predict exactly what will happen to the Sino-Tibetan dialogue in the 
near future. However, looking at past developments and the current political situation of both 
parties, possible prospects on Sino-Tibetan dialogue could be drawn. This chapter, therefore, 
analyzes the prospect of Sino-Tibetan dialogue from two possible outcomes. An optimistic 
argument where dialogue would take place in the near future either  with a fresh start or  
continue from where it left in the last meetings between envoys of Dalai Lama and 
representatives of United  Front Work  Department who serve as a gatekeeper to another 
office of CCP and government of PRC. Whereas a pessimist prospect possibility would be a 
continuation of the stalemate, furthering any possibilities that might lead to a settlement of 
Tibetan issue the crux of Sino-Tibetan dialogue. 
4.2 A Plausible breakthrough 
The present CCP under the leadership of Xi Jinping continues to accord priority to the 
Tibet issue. The longer spells of stalemate continue, more difficult it will be for Xi Jinping to 
achieve ‘China dream.' Eventually, the leadership in Beijing has to find a way to resolve 
Tibet issue. Considering reports coming out to be true then there are certain indication that 
channels have been activated between Beijing and Tibetan establishment in Dharamsala.
154
  
The justification of plausible breakthrough between two parties that could materialize in 
initiating another dialogue will discuss in following.  
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4.2.1 Exile’s outreach towards mainland Chinese citizens 
While the official channel establish  between Dharamsala and Beijing after the 
stalemate in 1987, the 14th Dalai Lama then the political
155
  and spiritual leader of Tibet, 
believed in reaching out the common citizen of PRC. The Dalai Lama feels that Chinese 
citizens deserve to know the truth and to know the truth; one must make every information 
available to them including the information on realities surrounding Tibetan issue. With that 
though in his mind the private office of Dalai Lama began to organize group meetings 
between the Dalai Lama and Chinese students or intellectual or general public during his 
foreign trip.  
It was during such meetings for the first time many Chinese realize how they were 
brainwashed by their government on actual history and present situation faced by Tibetans 
living under China. Since most of the meetings were based on Q A, many topics were 
covered ranging from history, human right, religious freedom, exile CTA, reincarnation, 
dialogue etc 
On year May 21, 2010, a Chinese intellectual Wang Lixiong organized first internet 
dialogue between Dalai Lama and Chinese citizen. It was first direct interaction between the 
Dalai Lama and Chinese citizens on social media. Wang asked the representatives of Dalai 
Lama, who was on tour to US for an hour in which Tibetan leader might answer questions 
from Chinese citizen. Dalai Lama agreed to use the hour of 8:00 to 9:00 (EST) on May 21. 
On open twitter account, Wang began to collect question for Dalai Lama from 19 May.
156
  On 
21May, Dalai Lama answered most voted top ten questions for the Chinese citizens. At the 
end of the session, Wang said that he was “ very pleased” with the response and the questions 
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http://tibet.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/hhdl-on-devolutin-in-ENG.pdf accessed on 28th April, 2014 
156 Perry Link, Talking about Tibet: An Open Dialogue between Chinese citizens and the Dalia Lama. Available at: 
http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2010/may/24/talking-about-tibet/ accessed on 28th April, 2014 
 
  80             
that rose to the top pile were indeed, in his view, a good representation of the actual concerns 
n the minds of Chinese citizens”.157  
Following the advice of Dalai Lama, the exiled Tibetans began to reach out the 
common Chinese citizens. One of the most successful projects for this purpose initiated by 
Mr.Thupten Samdup, who is currently a representative of Dalai Lama based in London. He 
established an NGO named “Tibetan Outreach” based in Dharamsala. At Tibetan Outreach 
office a small team of Tibetans log into public chat and social media platform, which can be 
access in China. Then they began their day by chatting with Chinese, who are online. 
Through chat, they provide information about core issues that, Chinese citizens should know 
about, for example, on exile Tibetan government’s policy, Dalai Lama’s Middle-way 
Approach, non-violent nature of the Tibetan struggle. 
The information section of the department of information and international relation 
also publish bulletins in Chinese on policies of exile government and present situation inside 
Tibet. All these information are made available to any Chinese citizen who visits 
Dharamsala. While the Office of Dalai Lama in Taipei play an active role in this campaign 
for providing correct information on policies of exile institution and Dalai Lama. Since 
thousands of tourist from mainland China visit Taipei every week, the office of Tibet utilized 
the opportunity by holding photo exhibition on Tibet, group discussion, movie screening and 
pamphlets distribution. 
From public level, Tibetan communities in western countries also began to develop a 
connection with oversea Chinese.
158
 College students have taken initiative by hosting meeting 
with titled “ Bridge conference” between young Tibetans and Chinese university students in 
                                                          
157 Ibid. 
158 Tibetan community in California US and Tibetan community in Sydney initiated similar venture of reach out programme. 
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New York. At one such meeting, Dalai Lama met with the students and clarified their doubts 
on issues related to Tibet.
159
  
Now after a decade of such outreach programme started by the Dalai Lama to Chinese 
citizens particularly students and intellectual, there is a sign of change in attitude towards 
Tibet.
160
  With growing number of Chinese understanding the real plight of Tibet and its 
support for Tibet’s demand for Regional national autonomy, there is every hope for citizen 
support for dialogue between Dharamsala and Beijing. 
4.2.2 Growing sympathy by overseas Chinese    
Last few years witnessed the growth of support by not only Chinese intellectuals but 
also officials toward Tibetan cause.
161
 This positive development could someday nurture into 
an important element towards establishment of Sino-Tibetan dialogue. 
When the protest broke out in different Tibetan inhabited areas of China in 2008, the 
central government vehemently blamed Dalai Lama and ‘clique’ for instigating the unrest 
inside Tibet and causing the disturbance to stability of the nation. The entire region was 
blocked, and Tibetan, took part in the protest were crushed down with military rule in major 
cities and towns of Tibet. The entire uprising by Tibetan people against the Chinese 
authorities was termed by Beijing and its state media as 3.14 incident more to sound like a 
terrorist attack than grieved people unhappy about its rules and the policies. 
However, for the first time in contemporary history of China, a group of Chinese 
writers and scholars issued a 12 points petition about the situation on Tibet.
162
  This petition 
                                                          
159 Tibetan and Chinese meet for bridge conference.  Available at: http://tibet.net/2010/03/03/tibetan-and-chinese-youths-to-meet-for-bridge-
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from-chinese-intellectuals-and-officials-for-tibetan-cause-encouraging-says-his-holiness-the-dalai-lama/ accessed on 1st May, 2014 
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calls the central government to stop its one sided propaganda that could further stir and 
amplify the ethnic animosity creating negative impact on safeguarding long term national 
unity. It further calls central government to share what is calls “sufficient evidence to prove 
this incident was organized, premeditated and meticulously orchestrated by the Dalai 
Cliques”. The protest in 1980s was mostly confined and limited to Lhasa and TAR region 
whereas in 2008, they have spread over Tibetan inhabited areas outside TAR. For that,  the 
intellectuals felt ‘serious mistakes in work has done with regards to Tibet '.163 It finally calls 
the central government to engage with the exile leader Dalai Lama through dialogue to 
resolve the difference. It was a bold initiative by the intellectuals to challenge the state 
version of the narrative on 2008 riot or unrest. Moreover, the truth is the sympathy they had 
on ordinary Tibetans, who became a victim of political investigation and revenge by both 
state and common Chinese citizens.
164
  
After this petition, number of articles written by Chinese intellectuals critical about is 
policies including policies on Tibet began to increase. According to Dalai Lama during his 
hour-long interview with Star in his resident, in Dharamsala, the Dalai Lama acknowledges 
“the growing support of Chinese in exile way”.165  Tibetan exile authorities have so far 
compiled a list of more than over 1000 articles written by Chinese intellectuals and scholars 
that are very critical about the (Chinese) government policy.  
Amongst the overseas Chinese supporters for Tibet, the dissident and victims of 
Chinese government like former member of Tiananmen peaceful protest in 1989 are more 
vocal and active in supporting the Tibetan cause. One of such supporters is Dr. Yang Jianli of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
162 Benjamin Kang; China dissidents call for dialogue with Dalai Lama   English translation of 12 point petition is available at 
http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2008/03/twelve-suggestions-for-dealing-with-the-tibetan-situation-by-some-chinese-intellectuals/ accessed on 1st  
May, 2014 
163 Ibid. Point 10 of the 12 point petition wrote by a group of Chinese intellectuals and scholars    
164 Reports came out that after the 2008 unrest in Tibetans were refused in hotels and inns in major Chinese cities. 
165 Rick Westhead Cautious support growing in China for Tibetan autonomy, Dalai Lama says. Available at: 
http://www.thestar.com/news/world/2010/10/16/cautious_support_growing_in_china_for_tibetan_autonomy_dalai_lama_says.html 
accessed on 2nd May, 2014 
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Initiatives for China, who believes in freedom for Tibetans. During one of protest rally in 
front of Chinese embassy in Washington, he said to a groups of Tibetans: 
Dear brothers and sisters, your pain is my pain and your freedom is my freedom. We, 
your Chinese brothers and sisters, will continue to join hands with you in your cause 
for freedom; our numbers are growing. As believers in truth principles of human 
rights, we will resolve to respect you as a people with every right to determine its own 
future. As a believers in the principles brotherhood, we will resolve to continue 
struggle side by side with y our freedom and ours.
166
    
Like Yang, there are many overseas Chinese who holds the similar view on Tibet and 
support Tibetan freedom movement. Harry Wu is another dissident of China, who is 
executive director of Laogai Research Foundation in New York. On 2012 august, he hosted a 
conference on Tibet.
167
 Where eight Tibetan former political prisoner were invited to speak 
about their time in Laogai after being arrested and charged by Chinese police for taking part 
in a peaceful demonstration calling freedom for Tibetan and the return of Dalai Lama. 
By taking active part in Tibetan freedom, movement either writing, speaking or 
sharing such information back in mainland by the overseas Chinese has contributed positive 
attitude towards Tibetan cause by general public in China. The central government cannot 
ignore this growing sympathy and support for Tibetan. 
4.2.3 Change in exile political discourse    
Since its establishment in 1960, the Tibetan government in exile now known as 
Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) has gone through important policy change in the 
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nature of dealing with PRC concerning Tibet issue, that is the core element of dialogue 
between two parties. Between 1959 until 1978, there was no direct contact between the Dalai 
Lama and Chinese government. Hence, the official stance was to restore independent Tibet. 
However, after the dead of Mao, Deng Xiaoping led China with wide campaign to 
rehabilitate the fallen political figures and normalize live in China followed by his new policy 
of economic development. Its under this campaign Deng initiated dialogue with the Dalai 
Lama.
168
 Deng succeeded in establishing contact with Gyalo Thondup the elder brother of 
Dalai Lama through Li Juisin, state news agency Xinhua’s head and China’s de facto official 
representative in Hong Kong. What happened after the meeting with Li was history.  
After accepting exile Tibetan fact-finding mission, CCP through Hu Yaobang then the 
party secretary presented five points on how rapprochement with Dalai Lama would establish 
in the future. The initial contact to the stalemate as discussed in the previous chapter clearly 
shows the beginning of the transformation in exile politics in dealing with the Tibetan issue. 
Since then the exile Tibetan government has been fighting for ‘Genuine Autonomy of Cholka 
sum’ the traditional three province of U Tsang, Amdo and Kham, which covers one forth of 
entire land mass of today’s PRC. 
During the renewed contact after the stalemate in 2002- 2010 the envoys of Dalai 
Lama presented ‘Memorandum of Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan People’ with greater 
concession under the same middle way approach, which was guiding principle during the 
previous engagement in late 70s. In the memorandum, importance was given to the resolution 
of Tibet issue by asking for regional, national autonomy for Tibetan inhabit areas. The 
discussion focuses on preserving Tibetan culture and identity, hence focusing only basic 
needs of the Tibetan like language, culture, religion, education, environment protection, 
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utilization of natural resources, public health and security, cultural, educational and religious 
exchange with foreign nations.
169
  
The change in the same policy came after evaluating the aspiration of Tibetan people, 
which the exile leader Dalai Lama states that Tibetans possesses rich and distinct history, 
culture and spiritual tradition that forms a valuable part of the heritage of humanity. Tibetans 
want to preserve and promote their culture and spiritual knowledge that suits the needs of 
21st century. At the same time, Tibetans could also benefit greatly from economic and 
scientific development that they need to live in association with PRC. 
Despite the fact that China squarely rejected the Tibetan memorandum, the new 
administration under Sikyong Lobsang Sangay continues to stick with the middle-way 
approach as a path to resolve Tibetan issue. Citing general support by international 
communities for the middle –way approach as it is a win-win policy for both parties. Exile 
Tibetans also witnessed strong middle-way approach awareness campaign. There was a time 
where Rangzen believers were almost consider as anti Dalai Lama. The situation normalizes 
when the representative of the private office of Dalai Lama, Prof Samdhong Rinpoche 
clarified the misconception. However, general Tibetan believes whoever goes against the 
wish of the Dalai Lama has no future within the establishment. Many groups and NGOs 
distance themselves from advocating Rangzen. The latest group was Gu-Chu-Sum movement 
of Tibet. A former political prisoner’s organization  which until September 29, 2013, held 
complete independence as political stance, made a u turn during its executive meeting at 
Dharamsala by shifting to the middle way approach, political stand in line with exile Tibetan 
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government’s policy of seeking genuine autonomy for Tibet within the framework of the 
constitution of PRC.
170
   
4.3 Stalemate continues 
Throughout the second leg of contact between Dharamsala and Beijing between 2002-
2010, there is one peculiar feature, the entire engagement was dictated by representative of 
China. Tibetan envoys had little said during the discussion despite having candid and open 
talk. When envoys of Dalai Lama finally presented the ‘Memorandum of Genuine Autonomy 
for the Tibetan People’ to the members of UFWD, Beijing rejected the memorandum calling 
it as disguised independence and unacceptable. 
Since then the official contact between Dharamsala and Beijing were lost once again. 
Tibetan exile administration has stated it is ready for a dialogue any time Beijing wants, but 
one needs two hand to clap and in this case, China’s hand in not forthcoming to make a sound 
of a clap. This section analyses the reason behind China’s non-corporative in taking part or 
restarting a dialogue with Dharamsala concerning Tibetan issue. 
4.3.1 Change in Leadership; China and Exile Tibetan Establishment  
The general political development between China and exile Tibetan establishment 
after the last official meeting was a change in the leadership. For many years, the Tibetan 
leader the Dalai Lama has spoken of his desire to cede political authority or enter into full 
‘retirement.'  It came to real during the Tibetan national uprising day on March 10, 2011, 
when he announced proposing such change during the sessions of Tibetan Parliament in Exile 
following week in Dharamsala.
171
  Despite Tibetan parliament’s request to Dalai Lama to 
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remain head of the state like that of Queen of England, Dalai Lama refused and urged 
members of Tibetan parliament to make necessary amendment in the charter. With the 
devolution of Dalai Lama’s political power, for the first time in Tibetan exile history the 
elected Sikyong (Prime minister) becomes the political leader of Tibetan people. That 
November witness the sworn in ceremony of newly elected Sikyong Lobsang Sangay, a 
Harvard academician. 
So far, in the past China claims, there is nothing to talk about Tibet, and it was only 
about personal status of the Dalai Lama. Moreover, the Chinese have only invited envoys of 
the Dalai Lama and not representative of exile Tibetan administration. Until March 2011, 
envoys of Dalai Lama indirectly represent the Tibetan government in exile, as Dalai Lama 
was temporal and spiritual leader of the Tibetan people. With the change in political 
leadership, in the exile administration, it cast doubt on whether Chinese would accept any 
representation from exile government for any future talk as China officially does not 
recognize the exile government. 
On the other hand, March 2013 witnessed leadership changes in PRC. Deng Xiaoping 
the former Prime Minister is believed to be a central force behind materialization of talks 
between envoys of the Dalai Lama and leaders of UFWD of CCP. With Deng’s departure 
from political power, someone with Deng’s will to create a peaceful and harmonious society 
can only make a call to open a dialogue with the Dharamsala. Looking at the present 
leadership especially in UFWD, there is doubt that such a push would ever make in the near 
future. 
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It is necessary to say a few words about China’s decision mechanism for policies on 
Tibet, particularly about the Central Working Coordination Small Group on Tibet.
172
  
Since the beginning of the Deng Xiaoping’s era, the Tibet Policy of the People’s 
Republic of China has been formulated during the five Tibet Work Forums.
173
 A Tibet Work 
Forum is usually held every five or ten years to discuss the CCP’s Tibet policies. These large 
meetings are attended by some 200 to 300 senior cadres, amongst others by the members of 
the all-powerful Politburo’s Standing Committee, senior PLA generals, representatives of the 
People’s Armed Police, United Front Work Department officials, regional leaders. The last 
Tibet Work Forum (the Fifth) was held in January 2010 in Beijing. 
The Small Group on Tibet is responsible for the implementation of the policies 
decided during the Tibet Work Forum. The chair of the Small Group on Tibet is usually held 
by the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) chairman. During the 
CCP’s 17th Congress, the Chairman of the Small Group on Tibet was Jia Qinglin, the then 
CPPCC chairperson. Other probable members were Ma Kai,
174
  Meng Jianzhu,
175
 Ling Jihua, 
and Du Qinglin and other unnamed officials. 
  After the 18th Party Congress leadership change, these leaders have secured 
good jobs,
176
  they will probably continue to participate in the deliberations of the Small 
Group on Tibet. The reconstituted Group, under the Chairmanship of Yu Zhengsheng and 
with more or less the same membership than the previous one, has been immediately 
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involved in the implementation of China’s Tibet policy. It implies that no or little 
improvement can be expected in Tibet in the near future. 
4.3.2 The rise of China’s global influence   
Year 2008 cannot be forgotten by entire world for the global financial meltdown and 
for the Tibetans it was a historic year where after a long time Tibet was brought back on the 
frontline of every newspaper and media. The Olympic protest followed by more than 125 
protest against the Chinese government on the Tibetan plateau.
177
   On April 10, 2008, the EU 
parliament passed a resolution on “the 2008 Tibet Uprising and the repression by the 
Government of PRC.”178   This decision called China to allow foreign media, open and 
independent inquiry under UN into the recent riots and repression in Tibet along with respect 
for human rights. In order to put pressure to China  the resolution also called “on the EU 
Presidency-in-Office, to strive to find a common EU position about the attendance of the 
Heads of the government and State and the EU High representative at the Olympic Games 
opening ceremony, with the option of non-attendance in the event that there is no resumption 
of dialogue between Chinese authorities and His Holiness the Dalai Lama”. 
Prior to the Beijing Summer Olympic, the Chinese leader under the pressure of 
international leaders called envoys of Dalai Lama to discuss Tibetan issue in June. It was 
China’s measure to build a positive image to the upcoming Olympic Games as discussion did 
not result in a positive outcome. 
Year 2008 in the financial world marked a near great depression scenario on entire 
global market. Western countries face with increasing unemployment and bankruptcy. As the 
West, struggled to revive their economies it turned towards China. EU needed China for its 
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economic recovery as much as the U.S. However, when Sarkozy met with Dalai Lama at 
Gdańsk, Poland on December 6, 2008, China cancelled 11th EU-China submits at that time 
France held EU Presidency. Economic effect on EU due to the cancellation of 11th EU-China 
submit was huge and in April 2009 French succumbed to the pressure of the Union to seek an 
apology from China. This apology came in the form of joint press communique
179
 where 
France accepted “One-China” policy and reaffirmed her position of Tibet as an integral part 
of Chinese territory. 
In October 2008, United Kingdom made a major shift in its position on Tibet. Almost 
after a century of recognizing Tibet as an autonomous entity, UK Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs David Miliband said that Britain had decided to recognize Tibet as a part of 
the People’s Republic of China.180 He described the British position as an anachronism and a 
colonial legacy. By replacing China’s “suzerainty” to “sovereignty” over Tibet, British not 
only sold out Tibet. It also casted major confusion on India as its northern border demarcated 
on the McMohan line that the script during Shimla Convention signed between British India 
and Tibet as “suzerainty” of China. The trade-off was for China’s monetary support to IMF 
so that economies of West could save. 
With changes in the British policy on Tibet, entire EU now agree to One-China policy 
where they recognize Tibet as an integral part of Chinese territory, Making their involvement 
confined to human right and religious freedom. 
The latest country to succumb toward China’s growing global financial influence is 
Norway. Its relationship with China froze when Norwegian Nobel Committee, an 
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independent group of five judges appointed by the Norwegian parliament, gave the Nobel 
Peace Prize to Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo. Liu had been sentenced in 2009 to 11 years in 
prison for subversion; probably for spearheading the drive for constitutional reform. By 
barring Liu and his family from attending, Beijing marked only the second time in history 
that a Nobel Peace Prize award in absentia- the first being a dissident in Nazi Germany. For a 
country trying to portray its rise as calm, it was an uncomfortable parallel. A furious Beijing 
blamed Oslo for the decision and suspended trade and political links with Norway. In order to 
restore the relationship with China, Norwegian Prime Minister for the first time in history of 
25th anniversary of Nobel Peace Prize shuns to meet with the exiled spiritual leader Dalai 
Lama. The foreign minister Borge Brende told reporters “We need to focus on our 
relationship with China”.181 
 The foreign policy under Hu Jintao’s leadership has been less about resolving the 
Tibet question by reaching an accommodation with the Dalai Lama and more about 
managing international criticism. Now due to the economic power and need of China for 
western nation’s growth, their bargaining moral power in bringing China to initiate dialogue 
with representative with Dalai Lama or exile Tibetan administration has diminished. 
4.3.3 PRC’s policies inside Tibet   
   The leadership in Beijing still holds same view that economic and infrastructural 
development only could bring lasting harmonious society in Tibetan inhabited regions. Along 
with the focus on economic development, leaders also strengthen their campaign against the 
Exile spiritual leader Dalai Lama. Ye Zhengsheng the Chairman of the Small group 
on Tibet during a tour from 6-8 January 2013 in Sichuan Province said that, “ fight against 
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Dalai Cliques should continue, adding that it was necessary to create a favorable social and 
political environment for economic development”.182  
The human rights organisation mentions: “A host of highly-intrusive mass 
surveillance campaigns such as the ‘Benefit the Masses, Solidify the Foundation,' ‘The Grid 
Management’ system, ‘New Socialist Villages’ and the recently-announced ‘Advanced Joint 
Household’ system are now being implemented in TAR. The official justification behind all 
these campaigns is that these campaigns would benefit the Tibetans in two ways: by 
providing long term stability and prosperity.” 183  Those who do not comply with these 
regulations severely punished. 
According to the TCHRD, on 28 September 2013, a serious confrontation occurred 
between the Chinese security forces and the local Tibetans in Mowa Village, in Diru County. 
The Tibetans rebelled against the compulsory order (under the ‘Nine Must Haves’ 
campaign
184
) to fly the five-starred red flags during the National Day celebrations. 
United Front Work, department that deals with Tibetan issue, opened a separate office 
to welcome exiled Tibetans. That office called: “Reception Centre for Overseas Tibetan”. 
The main purpose of the office was to change the loyalty of exiled Tibetans especially those 
working in a high post of exile institutions towards China.
185
 To achieve that exiled Tibetans 
on family visit in Tibet were wooed with high position governmental jobs and other facilities. 
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Few did fell into this trap of a new scheme and reward with big houses and job.
186
 Later they 
were used as a frontline “foot soldiers” in launching attacks against Dalai Lama. Its also a 
tactic used by China to create division to the existing unity within exile community as those 
Tibetans return from visit in Tibet were looked as source of suspicious.
187
  
Within this project, PRC was successful in manipulating the “shugden issue” by 
embracing shugden groups based in exile to create division.
188
 Beijing’s backing up the 
shugden group became a setback for Tibetan freedom movement as both exile administration 
and people for a certain period of time invest resources to fight against “shugden issue”.189  
The Communist Party of China seems to be preparing for the period post-Dalai Lama. 
This translates into the ‘spiritualisation’ of the Communist leadership on the Tibetan plateau. 
It seems paradoxical, but the atheist Communist Party of China (CCP) is getting increasingly 
interested in spiritual matters. The CCP has started promoting some reincarnated Lamas, 
known in China as ‘Living Buddhas,' in a much larger way than in the past. 
Ironically, the atheist regime in Beijing seemed more and more interested in the 
system of governance through ‘reincarnation’. In 2007, the Chinese State Administration for 
Religious Affairs in Beijing issued State Order No.5 stating the “Management Measures For 
the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism”. Beijing then started to promote 
‘Living Buddhas’ in the name of the Communist Party. 
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Beijing has recently been trying its utmost to increase its control over reincarnations 
of Tibetan lamas (and ultimately the Dalai Lama), thus legitimising the Communist rule over 
the Himalayan region. The Party has obviously decided to play the ‘religion’ card to resolve 
the Tibet issue. 
Every peace loving people would love to see the first prospect where the dialogue 
between Dharamsala and Beijing resume leading to a solution to the Tibetan issue. However, 
the real situation inside Tibet and China signals the later prospect of a longer stalemate 
further extending the Tibetan issue for the unknown period. 
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Conclusion 
According to China’s most recent white paper issued on October 22, 2013, it says, 
“After a series of key historical stages including the peaceful liberation, democratic reform, 
the establishment of the autonomous region and the reform and opening up drive, the Tibetan 
people have gained freedom, equality and dignity and are fully enjoying the fruits of modern 
civilization.”190  The Chinese government succeeds to mask the darker side of Tibet’s story in 
the face of global casement, yet recent wave ethnic unrest and self-immolation caught the 
eyes of the wider global populace contemplating that something is more serious than it 
seems, beyond Beijing’s fancied auspicious Tibet.  
This research began by featuring a concise note on the core issue deadlocks Beijing 
and Dharamsala on an intransigent dialogue process. While the fluctuation of the PRC’s 
power with political currents in China and calculations in exile escalate, both the party 
continues to perceive mutual incentives in a peaceful settlement for past sixty years despite 
much headway. For  understanding what accounts for the protracted nature of the Sino-
Tibetan conflict, this study considers the Sino- Tibetan conflict as a dilemmatic interplay of 
the insecurities or threat perceptions of the Chinese party-state and the Tibetan nation. The 
development of the security dilemma as a theoretical framework enabled a comprehensive 
analysis of not just the dynamic historical and contemporary interplay between the policies 
and approach of the Chinese and the Tibetans, but also the feedback effect operating between 
the conflict and the transnational and international environment within which  it is embedded. 
In the process of analyzing the development of Sino Tibetan discussion since 
establishment of the direct the contact with China by PRC’s then paramount Deng Xiaoping 
in 1979. The initial years of formal talks proved fruitless, and by 1984, the door to dialogue 
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was no longer open. Later in September 1988, Beijing’s interest in the discussion was 
rekindled following the Dalai Lama’s success in raising the Tibet profile in international 
forums. The Strasbourg proposal to the Members of European Parliament at Strasbourg, 15th 
June, 1988 conceded Tibet’s right to independence by calling for the “genuine autonomy” of 
a unified Tibet within the framework of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The Chinese 
openness to dialogue was indeed greater than it had before. However, internal Chinese 
politics undermined this initiative. In the aftermath of the Tiananmen crackdown, those in 
Beijing who had been promoting talks were shut out of power.  The early 1997, direct 
channels between Dharamsala and the Chinese leadership were quietly re-established with 
nine rounds of dialogue between the envoys of the Dalai Lama and Beijing, which have so far 
no visible progress. However the Tibetan side believed that the 9th round has produced some 
elements to build. However like earlier, China crashed exile Tibetan’s believe and dimming 
confidence when it respond that the Dalai Lama’s proposal as “disguised independence.”191   
Scrutinizing the nature of Sino Tibet dialogue under the security dilemma discussed in 
the third chapter, adoptions of many new policies  by Chinese government in Tibet as a 
measure of security strategy  further deteriorated the state of Sino-Tibetan talks. As 
mentioned by Michael Davis:  “China’s military occupation and CCP rule have spawned a 
cycle of resistance and further repression. Repression over the years has meant not only the 
armed invasion and crackdowns, but also to the sacking and razing of Buddhist monasteries 
during the cultural revolution. The suppression of religion, the imprisonment and coerced “re-
education” of dissidents as well as the forced relocation of rural dwellers to less remote and 
more urbanized areas. Tibetan resistance has occasionally involved open popular dissent and 
                                                          
191 Lodi Gyari. 8th round of Sino Tibetan dialogue identifies elements to build upon, February 2nd, 2010 Available at: 
https://www.savetibet.org/9th-round-of-sino-tibetan-dialogue-identifies-elements-to-build-upon/ Accessed on 11th April, 2014 
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rebellion, but more often has been a matter of smaller-scale resistance by monks, nuns, and 
others against Chinese rule and its methods.”192  
The situations inside Tibet deteriorated with Chinese policy of assimilation and 
disregarding all international calls and hues. The unrest in 2008 shocked the world when 
evidence of extreme human right violation came out of Tibet. China, however, continues its 
accusation and allegation toward exile Tibetan leader for the inciting disturbance in Tibet and 
still considers Tibet issue confines only to Dalai Lama’s personal well-being. They have 
launched a campaign against Dalai Lama for his effort in realizing the aspiration of Tibetans 
through the middle way approach policy. It looks like PRC believes that Tibetan issue would 
die with the passing of Dalai Lama in the near future. 
Since 1994, an anti-Dalai Lama campaign has been going on in the monasteries, 
nunneries, schools and colleges in Tibet. He is persona non grata in Tibet and the target of 
virtually all the political campaigns in Tibet. However, he remains as popular as ever among 
most Tibetans inside and outside Tibet. Wang Lixiong described, “The Dalai Lama power, 
unfortunately, for Beijing, a Dalai Lama exists among the exiled Tibetans. He cannot be 
vilified or forgotten; to all Tibetans, he is a “Bodhisattva” who gives meaning to life and 
significance to the pursuit of human life.”193  In the face of such a Bodhisattva, armed force, 
and political schemes seem to be no match. Many hardliners in Beijing are waiting for the 
Dalai Lama to pass away to end the issue of Tibet ones and for all. Still many are trying to 
maintain the status quo (opposing Dalai Lama by all means), so that their life will remain 
luxurious.  As put forth by Phuntsok Wangyal: “They make a living, are promoted and 
become rich by opposing splittism. If the Dalai Lama and the Central Government reconcile, 
these people will be in a state of trepidation, feel nervous and could lose their job. Any notion 
                                                          
192 Michael C. Davis, ‘The Quest for Self-Rule in Tibet,’ Journal of Democracy, Vol. 18, Number 4, October 2007: 162. 
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of delaying the problem until after the 14th Dalai Lama dies a natural death is not only naive, 
it is also unwise and especially tactically wrong (fearing the radicalization of young 
Tibetans).”194   
Today, Central Tibetan Administration (CTA), Dharamsala is consistently trying to 
get along with the People’s Republic of China through dialogue through their proposal of 
Middle Way Approach explicitly embodies the principle of Regional National Autonomy 
(RNA).
195
 The RNA derives its legal strength from the Regional National Autonomy Law 
(Autonomy Law), according to the Article Four of the PRC Constitution, which provides that 
Regional autonomy practice in areas where people of minority nationalities live in compact 
communities; in these areas organs of self-government are established for the exercise of the 
right of autonomy. All the national autonomous areas are inalienable parts of the People’s 
Republic of China. The people of all nationalities have the freedom to use and develop their 
own spoken and written languages, and to preserve or reform their own ways and customs, 
but none of those autonomy where actually practiced in the Tibetan Areas.  
Analyzing the current state of Tibet issue in the light of Sino Tibetan discussion, the 
dissertation reached in this end with two fold future prospect of the dialogue. First An 
optimistic angle defines that the dialogue would take place in the near future either with a 
fresh start or  continue from where the residual process of engagement between envoys of 
Dalai Lama and representatives of United  Front Work  Department under PRC. Where the 
pessimist prospect possibility negate any hopes of discussion, instead the stalemate expect to 
bed continue in the days to come furthering any possibilities that might lead to a settlement of 
Tibetan issue the crux of Sino-Tibetan dialogue. 
                                                          
194 Arpi Claude, Dharamsala and Beijing: The Negotiations That Never Were. Lancer Publishers LLC.2009 
195 Regional National Autonomy of PRC, Fact and figures 2002. Also available at: http://www.china.org.cn/english/tibet-english/mzzz.htm 
accessed on 5th May, 2014 
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The two contrasting view on the future prospect of the Sino Tibetan discussion is on 
the horns of a dilemma where both possibilities were manifest with the analytical studies. As 
discussed, there were significant reasons to rest our thoughts on the optimistic projection of 
the future dialogue, with reference to the recent development in Tibetan society and their 
effort in taking the engagement towards a new level.  However, considering the position of 
PRC towards the exile Tibetans, current Chinese policy in Tibet and its growing global 
economic influence reveals the intricate nature of the current discussion. Therefore as stated 
before, it would be difficult to predict exactly what will happen to the Sino-Tibetan dialogue 
in the near future; However,  analytical proposition present for the solution of the Sino 
Tibetan dispute with cited illustration relating to the discourse. 
As enshrined in the PRC constitution, to give Tibetan real sense of freedom, Beijing 
must reconsider a flexible constitutional path that can accommodate Tibet and its people. 
China’s objectives of a harmonious society would be advanced by welcoming the Dalai Lama 
and thousands of Tibetans home. If Tibetans and Chinese reconcile their differences, not only 
might Tibetans enjoy peace and self-determination but China might also become a respected 
and responsible global power that embodies democratic values and human rights of its 
citizens including Tibetans. For Beijing, an agreement would improve social and political 
stability and satisfy its craving for domestic and international legitimacy for its rule over 
Tibet with the Dalai Lama’s signature for the first time in history. It would remove an irritant 
in bilateral relations with India, the United States and Western European countries. More 
significantly, China can remove a weak-spot that could be exploited by hostile powers in a 
future conflict, which has recurrent precedents in the history of the Sino-Tibetan relations.   
Furthermore, a reasonable approach on Tibet may have a positive impact on 
Taiwanese attitude toward re-unification with China. In the context of Beijing’s ‘peaceful 
rise’ or ‘peaceful development’ approach, an agreement with the Tibetans would enhance 
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China’s international image around the world, especially in its wary neighborhood. As the 
Economist observed, ‘Talking to the Dalai Lama about the future of his homeland and giving 
more democracy to Hong Kong, would do more to impress China's neighbors than a decade's 
worth of state visits and free-trade agreements.’196  The Dalai Lama’s proposition would not 
challenge Chinese sovereignty or claim as “Tibetan” or “autonomous” any territory beyond 
that which the government has already designated as Tibetan autonomous; China knows that 
a failed strategy in Tibet is a problem for China. As Tibetan are the key stakeholder, that 
means the direct involvement of the Dalai Lama, whose legitimacy among the Tibetan people 
is indisputable essential for a peaceful and stable solution at right time.  Therefore, it is in the 
best interest of China and well as Tbetans, Beijing and the Central Tibetan Administration 
(CTA), Dharamsala needs to build a conducive atmosphere for negotiations with trust and 
confidence to move the ongoing process to a new level of engagement to achieve a mutually 
acceptable solution for the issue. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
196 The Economist, ‘China's Great Game in Asia,' 29 March, 2007. 
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Appendix A 
THE AGREEMENT OF THE CENTRAL PEOPLE’S GOVERNMENT AND THE LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT OF TIBET ON MEASURES FOR THE PEACEFUL LIBERATION OF TIBET 
 
23 MAY, 1951 
The Tibetan nationality is one of the nationalities with a long history within the boundaries of 
China and, like many other nationalities, it has done its glorious duty in the course of the creation and 
development of the great motherland. But over the last hundred years and more, imperialist forces 
penetrated into China, and in consequence, also penetrated into the Tibetan region and carried out all 
kinds of deceptions and provocations. Like previous reactionary Governments, the Kuomintang 
reactionary government continued to carry out a policy of oppression and sowing dissension among 
the nationalities, causing division and disunity among the Tibetan people. The Local Government of 
Tibet did not oppose imperialist deception and provocations, but adopted an unpatriotic attitude 
towards the great motherland. Under such conditions, the Tibetan nationality and people were plunged 
into the depths of enslavement and suffering. 
In 1949, basic victory was achieved on a nation-wide scale in the Chinese people's war of 
liberation; the common domestic enemy of all nationalities—the Kuomintang reactionary 
government—was overthrown; and the common foreign enemy of all nationalities—the aggressive 
imperialist forces— was driven out. On this basis, the founding of the People's Republic of China and 
of the Central People's Government was announced. In accordance with the Common Programme 
passed by the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, the Central People's Government 
declared that all nationalities within the boundaries of the People's Republic of China are equal, and 
that they shall establish unity and mutual aid and oppose imperialism and their own public enemies, 
so that the People's Republic of China may become one big family of fraternity and cooperation, 
composed of all its nationalities. Within this big family of nationalities of the People's Republic of 
China, national regional autonomy is to be exercised in areas where national minorities are 
concentrated, and all national minorities are to have freedom to develop their spoken and written 
languages and to preserve or reform their customs, habits, and religious beliefs, and the Central 
People's Government will assist all national minorities to develop their political, economic, cultural, 
and educational construction work. Since then, all nationalities within the country, with the exception 
of those in the areas of Tibet and Taiwan, have gained liberation. Under the unified leadership of the 
Central People's Government and the direct leadership of the higher levels of People's Governments, 
all national minorities have fully enjoyed the right of national equality and have exercised, or are 
exercising, national regional autonomy. 
In order that the influences of aggressive imperialist forces in Tibet may be successfully 
eliminated, the unification of the territory and sovereignty of the People's Republic of China 
accomplished, and national defence safeguarded; in order that the Tibetan nationality and people may 
be freed and return to the big family of the People's Republic of China to enjoy the same rights of 
national equality as all other nationalities in the country and develop their political, economic, 
cultural, and educational work, the Central People's Government, when it ordered the People's 
Liberation Army to march into Tibet, notified the local government of Tibet to send delegates to the 
Central Authorities to hold talks for the conclusion of an agreement on measures for the peaceful 
liberation of Tibet. At the latter part of April, 1951, the delegates with full powers from the Local 
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Government of Tibet arrived in Peking. The Central People's Government appointed representatives 
with full powers to conduct talks on a friendly basis with the delegates of the Local Government of 
Tibet. The result of the talks is that both parties have agreed to establish this agreement and ensure 
that it be carried into effect. 
1. The Tibetan people shall be united and drive out the imperialist aggressive forces from 
Tibet; that the Tibetan people shall return to the big family of the motherland--the People's Republic 
of China. 
2. The Local Government of Tibet shall actively assist the People's Liberation Army to enter 
Tibet and consolidate the national defences. 
3. In accordance with the policy towards nationalities laid down in the Common Programme 
of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, the Tibetan people have the right of 
exercising national regional autonomy under the unified leadership of the Central People’s 
Government. 
4. The Central Authorities will not alter the existing political system in Tibet. The Central 
Authorities also will not alter the established status, functions and powers of the Dalai Lama. Officials 
of various ranks shall hold office as usual. 
5. The established status, functions, and powers of the Panchen Ngoerhtehni shall be 
maintained. 
6. By the established status, functions and powers of the Dalai Lama and of the Panchen 
Ngoerhtehni is meant the status, functions and powers of the 13th Dalai Lama and of the 9
th
 Panchen 
Ngoerhtehni when they were in friendly and amicable relations with each other. 
7. The policy of freedom of religious belief laid down in the Common Programme of the 
Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference will be protected. The Central Authorities will not 
effect any change in the income of the monasteries. 
8. The Tibetan troops will be reorganised step by step into the People's Liberation Army, and 
become a part of the national defence forces of the Central People's Government. 
9. The spoken and written language and school education of the Tibetan nationality will be 
developed step by step in accordance with the actual conditions in Tibet. 
10. Tibetan agriculture, livestock raising, industry and commerce will be developed step by 
step, 
and the people's livelihood shall be improved step by step in accordance with the actual 
conditions in Tibet. 
11. In matters related to various reforms in Tibet, there will be no compulsion on the part of 
the Central Authorities. The Local Government of Tibet should carry out reforms of its own accord, 
and when the people raise demands for reform, they must be settled through consultation with the 
leading personnel of Tibet. 
12. In so far as former pro-imperialist and pro-KMT officials resolutely sever relations with 
imperialism and the KMT and do not engage in sabotage or resistance, they may continue to hold 
office irrespective of their past. 
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13. The People's Liberation Army entering Tibet will abide by the above-mentioned policies 
and will also be fair in all buying and selling and will not arbitrarily take even a needle or a thread 
from the people. 
14. The Central People's Government will handle all external affairs of the area of Tibet; and 
there will be peaceful co-existence with neighboring countries and the establishment and development 
of fair commercial and trading relations with them on the basis of equality, mutual benefit and mutual 
respect for territory and sovereignty. 
15. In order to ensure the implementation of this agreement, the Central People's Government 
will set up a military and administrative committee and a military area headquarters in Tibet, and 
apart from the personnel sent there by the Central People's Government it will absorb as many local 
Tibetan personnel as possible to take part in the work. Local Tibetan personnel taking part in the 
military and administrative committee may include patriotic elements from the Local Government of 
Tibet, various district and various principal monasteries; the name list is to be prepared after 
consultation between the representatives designated by the Central People's Government and various 
quarters concerned, and is to be submitted to the Central People's Government for approval. 
16. Funds needed by the military and administrative committee, the military area headquarters 
and the People's Liberation Army entering Tibet will be provided by the Central People's 
Government. The Local Government of Tibet should assist the People's Liberation Army in the 
purchases and transportation of food, fodder, and other daily necessities. 
17. This agreement shall come into force immediately after signatures and seals are affixed to 
it. 
Signed and sealed by delegates of the Central People's Government with full powers: 
Chief Delegate: Li Weihan (Chairman of the Commission of Nationalities Affairs); 
Delegates: Zhang Jingwu, Zhang Guohua, Sun Zhiyuan. 
Delegates with full powers of the Local Government of Tibet: 
Chief Delegate: Kalon Ngabo Ngawang Jigme 
Delegates: Khemey Sonam Wangdu, Lhawutara Thupten Tenthar, Thupten Lekmon Rimshi, 
Sampo Tenzin Thondup. 
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           Appendix B 
THE FIVE-POINT PEACE PLAN 
Washington DC, 21 September, 1987 
 
While addressing in the US Congressional Human Rights Caucus the Dalai Lama proposed a 
Five-Point Peace Plan for the restoration of peace and human rights in Tibet. The plan called for; 
1. Transformation of the whole of Tibet into a zone of Ahimsa, demilitarized zone of 
peace and non-violence. 
2. Abandonment of China’s population transfer policy, which threatened the very 
existence of the Tibetans as a people. 
3. Respect for the Tibetan people’s fundamental human rights and democratic freedoms; 
4. Restoration of and protection of Tibet’s natural environment and abandonment of 
China’s use of Tibet for the production of nuclear weapons and dumping of nuclear waste; 
5. Commencement of earnest negotiations on the future status of Tibet and of relations 
between the Tibetan and Chinese people. 
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Appendix C 
HIS HOLINESS THE DALAI LAMA’S ADDRESS TO THE MEMBERS OF EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT  
 
                                                 Strasbourg, June 15, 1988 
We are living today in a very interdependent world. One nation's problems can no longer be 
solved by itself. Without a sense of universal responsibility our very survival is in danger. I have, 
therefore, always believed in the need for better understanding, closer cooperation and greater respect 
among the various nations of the world. The European Parliament is an inspiring example. Out of the 
chaos of war, those who were once enemies have, in a single generation, learned to co-exist and to 
cooperate. I am, therefore, particularly pleased and honored to address this gathering at the European 
Parliament.  
As you know, my country - Tibet - is undergoing a very difficult period. The Tibetans – 
particularly those who live under Chinese occupation yearn for freedom and justice and a self-
determined future, so that they are able to fully preserve their unique identity and live in peace with 
their neighbors.  
For over a thousand years we Tibetans have adhered to spiritual and environmental values in 
order to maintain the delicate balance of life across the high plateau on which we live. Inspired by the 
Buddha's message on non-violence and compassion and protected by our mountains, we sought to 
respect every form of life and to abandon war as an instrument of national policy.  
Our history, dating back more than two thousand years, has been one of independence. At no 
time, since the founding of our nation in 127 BC, have we Tibetans conceded our sovereignty to a 
foreign power. As with all nations, Tibet experienced periods in which our neighbors - Mongol, 
Manchu, Chinese, British and the Gorkhas of Nepal- sought to establish influence over us. These eras 
have been brief and the Tibetan people have never accepted them as constituting a loss of our national 
sovereignty. In fact, there have been occasions when Tibetan rulers conquered vast areas of China and 
other neighboring states. This, however, does not mean that we Tibetans can lay claim to these 
territories.  
In 1949 the People's Republic of China forcibly invaded Tibet. Since that time, Tibet has 
endured the darkest period in its history. More than a million of our people have died as a result of the 
occupation. Thousands of monasteries were reduced to ruins. A generation has grown up deprived of 
education, economic opportunity and a sense of its own national character. Though the current 
Chinese leadership has implemented certain reforms, it is also promoting a massive population 
transfer onto the Tibetan plateau. This policy has already reduced the six million Tibetans to a 
minority. Speaking for all Tibetans, I must sadly inform you, our tragedy continues.  
I have always urged my people not to resort to violence in their efforts to redress their 
suffering. Yet I believe all people have the moral right to peacefully protest injustice. Unfortunately, 
the demonstrations in Tibet have been violently suppressed by the Chinese police and military. I will 
continue to counsel for non-violence, but unless China forsakes the brutal methods it employs, 
Tibetans cannot be responsible for a further deterioration in the situation.  
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Every Tibetan hopes and prays for the full restoration of our nation's independence. 
Thousands of our people have sacrificed their lives and our whole nation has suffered in this struggle. 
Even in recent months, Tibetans have bravely sacrificed their lives to achieve this precious goal. On 
the other hand, the Chinese totally fail to recognize the Tibetan people's aspirations and continue to 
pursue a policy of brutal suppression.  
I have thought for a long time on how to achieve a realistic solution to my nation's plight. My 
Cabinet and I solicited the opinions of many friends and concerned persons. As a result, on September 
21, 1987, at the Congressional Human Rights Caucus in Washington, DC, I announced a Five-Point 
Peace Plan for Tibet. In it, I called for the conversion of Tibet into a zone of peace, a sanctuary in 
which humanity and nature can live together in harmony. I also called for respect for human rights 
and democratic ideals, environmental protection and a halt to the Chinese population transfer into 
Tibet.  
The fifth point of the Peace Plan called for earnest negotiations between the Tibetans and the 
Chinese. We have, therefore, taken the initiative to formulate some thoughts which, we hope, may 
serve as a basis for resolving the issue of Tibet. I would like to take this opportunity to inform the 
distinguished gathering here of the main points of our thinking.  
The whole of Tibet known as Cholka-Sum (U-Tsang, Kham and Amdo) should become a 
self-governing democratic political entity founded on law by agreement of the people for the common 
good and the protection of themselves and their environment, in association with the People's 
Republic of China.  
The Government of the People's Republic of China could remain responsible for Tibet's 
foreign policy. The Government of Tibet should, however, develop and maintain relations, through its 
own Foreign Affairs Bureau, in the fields of religion, commerce, education, culture, tourism, science, 
sports and other non-political activities. Tibet should join international organizations concerned with 
such activities.  
The Government of Tibet should be founded on a constitution of basic law. The basic law 
should provide for a democratic system of government entrusted with the task of ensuring economic 
equality, social justice and protection of the environment. This means that the Government of Tibet 
will have the right to decide on all affairs relating to Tibet and the Tibetans.  
As individual freedom is the real source and potential of any society's development, the 
Government of Tibet would seek to ensure this freedom by full adherence to the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, including the rights to speech, assembly, and religion. Because religion 
constitutes the source of Tibet's national identity, and spiritual values lie at the very heart of Tibet's 
rich culture, it would be the special duty of the Government of Tibet to safeguard and develop its 
practice.  
The Government should be comprised of a popularly elected Chief Executive, a bi-cameral 
legislative branch, and an independent judicial system. Its seat should be in Lhasa.  
The social and economic system of Tibet should be determined in accordance with the wishes 
of the Tibetan people, bearing in mind especially the need to raise the standard of living of the entire 
population.  
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The Government of Tibet would pass strict laws to protect wildlife and plant life. The 
exploitation of natural resources would be carefully regulated. The manufacture, testing and 
stockpiling of nuclear weapons and other armaments must be prohibited, as well as the use of nuclear 
power and other technologies which produce hazardous waste. It would be the Government of Tibet's 
goal to transform Tibet into our planet's largest natural preserve.  
A regional peace conference should be called to ensure that Tibet becomes a genuine 
sanctuary of peace through demilitarization. Until such a peace conference can be convened and 
demilitarization and neutralization achieved, China could have the right to maintain a restricted 
number of military installations in Tibet. These must be solely for defense purposes.  
In order to create an atmosphere of trust conducive to fruitful negotiations, the Chinese 
Government should cease its human rights violations in Tibet and abandon its policy of transferring 
Chinese to Tibet.  These are the thoughts we have in mind. I am aware that many Tibetans will be 
disappointed by the moderate stand they represent. Undoubtedly, there will be much discussion in the 
coming months within our own community, both in Tibet and in exile. This, however, is an essential 
and invaluable part of any process of change. I believe these thoughts represent the most realistic 
means by which to reestablish Tibet's separate identity and restore the fundamental rights of the 
Tibetan people while accommodating China's own interests. I would like to emphasize, however, that 
whatever the outcome of the negotiations with the Chinese may be, the Tibetan people themselves 
must be the ultimate deciding authority. Therefore, any proposal will contain a comprehensive 
procedural plan to ascertain the wishes of the Tibetan people in a nationwide referendum.  
I would like to take this opportunity to state that I do not wish to take any active part in the 
Government of Tibet. Nevertheless, I will continue to work as much as I can for the well-being and 
happiness of the Tibetan people as long as it is necessary.  
We are ready to present a proposal to the Government of the People's Republic of China 
based on the thoughts I have presented. A negotiating team representing the Tibetan Government has 
been selected. 
We are prepared to meet with the Chinese to discuss details of such a proposal aimed at 
achieving an equitable solution.  
We are encouraged by the keen interest being shown in our situation by a growing number of 
governments and political leaders, including former President Jimmy Carter of the United States. We 
are also encouraged by the recent changes in China which have brought about a new group of 
leadership, more pragmatic and liberal.  We urge the Chinese Government and leadership to give 
serious and substantive consideration to the ideas I have described. Only dialogue and a willingness to 
look with honesty and clarity at the reality of Tibet can lead to a viable solution. We wish to conduct 
discussions with the Chinese Government bearing in mind the larger interests of humanity. Our 
proposal will therefore be made in a spirit of conciliation and we hope that the Chinese will respond 
accordingly.  
My country's unique history and profound spiritual heritage render it ideally suited for 
fulfilling the role of a sanctuary of peace at the heart of Asia. Its historic status as a neutral buffer 
state, contributing to the stability of the entire continent, can be restored. Peace and security for Asia 
as well as for the world at large can be enhanced. In the future, Tibet need no longer be an occupied 
land, oppressed by force, unproductive and scarred by suffering. It can become a free haven where 
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humanity and nature live in harmonious balance; a creative model for the resolution of tensions 
afflicting many areas throughout the world.  
The Chinese leadership needs to realize that colonial rule over occupied territories is today 
anachronistic. A genuine union or association can only come about voluntarily, when there is 
satisfactory benefit to all the parties concerned. The European Community is a clear example of this. 
On the other hand, even one country or community can break into two or more entities when 
there is a lack of trust or benefit, and when force is used as the principal means of rule.  
I would like to end by making a special appeal to the honorable members of the European 
Parliament and through them to their respective constituencies to extend their support to our efforts. A 
resolution of the Tibetan problem within the framework that we propose will not only be for the 
mutual benefit of the Tibetan and Chinese people but will also contribute to regional and global peace 
and stability. I thank you for providing me the opportunity to share my thoughts with you. 
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Appendix D 
Memorandum of genuine autonomy 
 
 
I  INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the renewal of direct contact with the Central Government of the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) in 2002, extensive discussions have been held between the envoys of His Holiness the 14th 
Dalai Lama and representatives of the Central Government. In these discussions we have put forth 
clearly the aspirations of Tibetans. The essence of the Middle Way Approach is to secure genuine 
autonomy for the Tibetan people within the scope of the Constitution of the PRC. This is of mutual 
benefit and based on the long-term interest of both the Tibetan and Chinese peoples. We remain 
firmly committed not to seek separation or independence. We are seeking a solution to the Tibetan 
problem through genuine autonomy, which is compatible with the principles on autonomy in the 
Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The protection and development of the unique 
Tibetan identity in all its aspects serves the larger interest of humanity in general and those of the 
Tibetan and Chinese people in particular. 
During the seventh round of talks in Beijing on 1 and 2 July 2008, the Vice Chairman of the Chinese 
People’s Political Consultative Conference and the Minister of the Central United Front Work 
Department, Mr. Du Qinglin, explicitly invited suggestions from His Holiness the Dalai Lama for the 
stability and development of Tibet. The Executive Vice Minister of the Central United Front Work 
Department, Mr. Zhu Weiqun, further said they would like to hear our views on the degree or form of 
autonomy we are seeking as well as on all aspects of regional autonomy within the scope of the 
Constitution of the PRC. 
Accordingly, this memorandum puts forth our position on genuine autonomy and how the specific 
needs of the Tibetan nationality for autonomy and self-government can be met through application of 
the principles on autonomy of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, as we understand 
them. On this basis, His Holiness the Dalai Lama is confident that the basic needs of the Tibetan 
nationality can be met through genuine autonomy within the PRC. 
The PRC is a multi-national state, and as in many other parts of the world, it seeks to resolve the 
nationality question through autonomy and the self-government of the minority nationalities.  The 
Constitution of the PRC contains fundamental principles on autonomy and self-government whose 
objectives are compatible with the needs and aspirations of the Tibetans.  Regional national autonomy 
is aimed at opposing both the oppression and the separation of nationalities by rejecting both Han 
Chauvinism and local nationalism. It is intended to ensure the protection of the culture and the 
identity of minority nationalities by powering them to become masters of their own affairs. 
To a very considerable extent Tibetan needs can be met within the constitutional principles on 
autonomy, as we understand them. On several points, the Constitution gives significant discretionary 
powers to state organs in the decision-making and on the operation of the system of autonomy. These 
discretionary powers can be exercised to facilitate genuine autonomy for Tibetans in ways that would 
respond to the uniqueness of the Tibetan situation. In implementing these principles, legislation 
relevant to autonomy may consequently need to be reviewed or amended to respond to the specific 
characteristics and needs of the Tibetan nationality. Given good will on both sides, outstanding 
problems can be resolved within the constitutional principles on autonomy. In this way national unity 
and stability and harmonious relations between the Tibetan and other nationalities will be established. 
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II  RESPECT FOR THE INTEGRITY OF THE TIBETAN NATIONALITY 
 
Tibetans belong to one minority nationality regardless of the current administrative division.  The 
integrity of the Tibetan nationality must be respected. That is the spirit, the intent and the principle 
underlying the constitutional concept of national regional autonomy as well as the principle of 
equality of nationalities. 
There is no dispute about the fact that Tibetans share the same language, culture, spiritual tradition, 
core values and customs, that they belong to the same ethnic group and that they have a strong sense 
of common identity. Tibetans share a common history and despite periods of political or 
administrative divisions, Tibetans continuously remained united by their religion, culture, education, 
language, way of life and by their unique high plateau environment. 
The Tibetan nationality lives in one contiguous area on the Tibetan plateau, which they have inhabited 
for millennia and to which they are therefore indigenous. For purposes of the constitutional principles 
of national regional autonomy Tibetans in the PRC in fact live as a single nationality all over the 
Tibetan plateau. 
On account of the above reasons, the PRC has recognised the Tibetan nationality as one of the 55 
minority nationalities. 
III  TIBETAN ASPIRATIONS 
 
Tibetans have a rich and distinct history, culture and spiritual tradition all of which form valuable 
parts of the heritage of humanity. Not only do Tibetans wish to preserve their own heritage, which 
they cherish, but equally they wish to further develop their culture and spiritual life and knowledge in 
ways that are particularly suited to the needs and conditions of humanity in the 21st century. 
As a part of the multi-national state of the PRC, Tibetans can benefit greatly from the rapid economic 
and scientific development the country is experiencing. While wanting to actively participate and 
contribute to this development, we want to ensure that this happens without the people losing their 
Tibetan identity, culture and core values and without putting the distinct and fragile environment of 
the Tibetan plateau, to which Tibetans are indigenous, at risk. 
The uniqueness of the Tibetan situation has consistently been recognised within the PRC and has been 
reflected in the terms of the ‘17 Point Agreement’ and in statements and policies of successive leaders 
of the PRC since then, and should remain the basis for defining the scope and structure of the specific 
autonomy to be exercised by the Tibetan nationality within the PRC. The Constitution reflects a 
fundamental principle of flexibility to accommodate special situations, including the special 
characteristics and needs of minority nationalities. 
His Holiness the Dalai Lama’s commitment to seek a solution for the Tibetan people within the PRC 
is clear and unambiguous.  This position is in full compliance and agreement with paramount leader 
Deng Xiaoping’s statement in which he emphasised that except for independence all other issues 
could be resolved through dialogue. Whereas, we are committed, therefore, to fully respect the 
territorial integrity of the PRC, we expect the Central Government to recognise and fully respect the 
integrity of the Tibetan nationality and its right to exercise genuine autonomy within the PRC. We 
believe that this is the basis for resolving the differences between us and promoting unity, stability 
and harmony among nationalities. 
For Tibetans to advance as a distinct nationality within the PRC, they need to continue to progress and 
develop economically, socially and politically in ways that correspond to the development of the PRC 
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and the world as a whole while respecting and nurturing the Tibetan characteristics of such 
development. For this to happen, it is imperative that the right of Tibetans to govern themselves be 
recognised and implemented throughout the region where they live in compact communities in the 
PRC, in accordance with the Tibetan nationality’s own needs, priorities and characteristics. 
The Tibetan people’s culture and identity can only be preserved and promoted by the Tibetans 
themselves and not by any others.  Therefore, Tibetans should be capable of self-help, self-
development and self-government, and an optimal balance needs to be found between this and the 
necessary and welcome guidance and assistance for Tibet from the Central Government and other 
provinces and regions of the PRC. 
IV BASIC NEEDS OF TIBETANS 
 
Subject Matters of Self-government 
 
1)  Language 
 
Language is the most important attribute of the Tibetan people’s identity. Tibetan is the primary 
means of communication, the language in which their literature, their spiritual texts and historical as 
well as scientific works are written. The Tibetan language is not only at the same high level as that of 
Sanskrit in terms of grammar, but is also the only one that has the capability of translating from 
Sanskrit without an iota of error. Therefore, Tibetan language has not only the richest and best-
translated literatures, many scholars even contend that it has also the richest and largest number of 
literary compositions. The Constitution of the PRC, in Article 4, guarantees the freedom of all 
nationalities “to use and develop their own spoken and written languages …”. 
In order for Tibetans to use and develop their own language, Tibetan must be respected as the main 
spoken and written language. Similarly, the principal language of the Tibetan autonomous areas needs 
to be Tibetan. 
This principle is broadly recognised in the Constitution in Article 121, which states, “the organs of 
self-government of the national autonomous areas employ the spoken and written language or 
language in common use in the locality.”  Article 10 of the Law on Regional National Autonomy 
(LRNA) provides that these organs “shall guarantee the freedom of the nationalities in these areas to 
use and develop their own spoken and written languages….” 
Consistent with the principle of recognition of Tibetan as the main language in Tibetan areas, the 
LRNA (Article 36) also allows the autonomous government authorities to decide on “the language 
used in instruction and enrolment procedures” with regard to education.  This implies recognition of 
the principle that the principal medium of education be Tibetan. 
2)  Culture 
 
The concept of national regional autonomy is primarily for the purpose of preservation of the culture 
of minority nationalities. Consequently, the constitution of PRC contains references to cultural 
preservation in Articles 22, 47 and 119 as also in Article 38 of the LRNA. To Tibetans, Tibetan 
culture is closely connected to our religion, tradition, language and identity, which are facing threats 
at various levels. Since Tibetans live within the multinational state of the PRC, this distinct Tibetan 
cultural heritage needs protection through appropriate constitutional provisions. 
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3)  Religion 
 
Religion is fundamental to Tibetans and Buddhism is closely linked to their identity. We recognise the 
importance of separation of church and state, but this should not affect the freedom and practice of 
believers. It is impossible for Tibetans to imagine personal or community freedom without the 
freedom of belief, conscience and religion. The Constitution recognises the importance of religion and 
protects the right to profess it.  Article 36 guarantees all citizens the right to the freedom of religious 
belief. No one can compel another to believe in or not to believe in any religion. Discrimination on 
the basis of religion is forbidden. 
 
An interpretation of the constitutional principle in light of international standard would also cover the 
freedom of the manner of belief or worship. The freedom covers the right of monasteries to be 
organised and run according to Buddhist monastic tradition, to engage in teachings and studies, and to 
enroll any number of monks and nuns or age group in accordance with these rules. The normal 
practice to hold public teachings and the empowerment of large gatherings is covered by this freedom 
and the state should not interfere in religious practices and traditions, such as the relationship between 
a teacher and his disciple, management of monastic institutions, and the recognition of reincarnations. 
4)  Education 
 
The desire of Tibetans to develop and administer their own education system in cooperation and in 
coordination with the central government’s ministry of education is supported by the principles 
contained in the Constitution with regard to education. So is the aspiration to engage in and contribute 
to the development of science and technology. We note the increasing recognition in international 
scientific development of the contribution which Buddhist psychology, metaphysics, cosmology and 
the understanding of the mind is making to modern science. 
Whereas, under Article 19 of the Constitution the state takes on the overall responsibility to provide 
education for its citizens, Article 119 recognises the principle that “[T]he organs of self-government 
of the national autonomous areas independently administer educational …. affairs in their respective 
areas…”  This principle is also reflected in Article 36 of the LRNA. 
Since the degree of autonomy in decision-making is unclear, the point to be emphasised is that the 
Tibetan need to exercise genuine autonomy with regard to its own nationality’s education and this is 
supported by the principles of the constitution on autonomy. 
As for the aspiration to engage in and contribute to the development of scientific knowledge and 
technology, the Constitution (Article 119) and the LRNA (Article 39) clearly recognise the right of 
autonomous areas to develop scientific knowledge and technology. 
5)  Environment Protection 
 
Tibet is the prime source of Asia’s great rivers. It also has the earth’s loftiest mountains as well as the 
world’s most extensive and highest plateau, rich in mineral resources, ancient forests, and many deep 
valleys untouched by human disturbances. 
This environmental protection practice was enhanced by the Tibetan people’s traditional respect for 
all forms of life, which prohibits the harming of all sentient beings, whether human or animal. Tibet 
used to be an unspoiled wilderness sanctuary in a unique natural environment. 
Today, Tibet’s traditional environment is suffering irreparable damage. The effects of this are 
especially notable on the grasslands, the croplands, the forests, the water resources and the wildlife. 
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In view of this, according to Articles 45 and 66 of the LNRA, the Tibetan people should be given the 
right over the environment and allow them to follow their traditional conservation practices. 
6)  Utilisation of Natural Resources 
 
With respect to the protection and management of the natural environment and the utilisation of 
natural resources the Constitution and the LRNA only acknowledge a limited role for the organs of 
self-government of the autonomous areas (see LRNA Articles 27, 28, 45, 66, and Article 118 of the 
Constitution, which pledges that the state “shall give due consideration to the interests of [the national 
autonomous areas]]”.  The LRNA recognises the importance for the autonomous areas to protect and 
develop forests and grasslands (Article 27) and to “give priority to the rational exploitation and 
utilization of the natural resources that the local authorities are entitled to develop”, but only within 
the limits of state plans and legal stipulations. In fact, the central role of the State in these matters is 
reflected in the Constitution (Article 9). 
The principles of autonomy enunciated in the Constitution cannot, in our view, truly lead to Tibetans 
becoming masters of their own destiny if they are not sufficiently involved in decision-making on 
utilisation of natural resources such as mineral resources, waters, forests, mountains, grasslands, etc. 
The ownership of land is the foundation on which the development of natural resources, taxes and 
revenues of an economy are based.  Therefore, it is essential that only the nationality of the 
autonomous region shall have the legal authority to transfer or lease land, except land owned by the 
state. In the same manner, the autonomous region must have the independent authority to formulate 
and implement developmental plans concurrent to the state plans. 
7)  Economic Development and Trade 
 
Economic Development in Tibet is welcome and much needed. The Tibetan people remain one of the 
most economically backward regions within the PRC. 
The Constitution recognises the principle that the autonomous authorities have an important role to 
play in the economic development of their areas in view of local characteristics and needs (Article 
118 of the Constitution, also reflected in LRNA Article 25). The Constitution also recognises the 
principle of autonomy in the administration and management of finances (Article 117, and LRNA 
Article 32). At the same time, the Constitution also recognises the importance of providing State 
funding and assistance to the autonomous areas to accelerate development (Article 122, LRNA 
Article 22). 
Similarly, Article 31 of the LRNA recognises the competence of autonomous areas, especially those 
such as Tibet, adjoining foreign countries, to conduct border trade as well as trade with foreign 
countries. The recognition of these principles is important to the Tibetan nationality given the region’s 
proximity to foreign countries with which the people have cultural, religious, ethnic and economic 
affinities. 
The assistance rendered by the Central Government and the provinces has temporary benefits, but in 
the long run if the Tibetan people are not self-reliant and become dependent on others it has greater 
harm. Therefore, an important objective of autonomy is to make the Tibetan people economically 
self-reliant. 
8)  Public health 
 
The Constitution enunciates the responsibility of the State to provide health and medical services 
(Article 21). Article 119 recognises that this is an area of responsibility of the autonomous areas. The 
  114             
LRNA (Article 40) also recognises the right of organs of self-government of the autonomous areas to 
“make independent decisions on plans for developing local medical and health services and for 
advancing both modern and the traditional medicine of the nationalities.” 
The existing health system fails to adequately cover the needs of the rural Tibetan 
population.  According to the principles of the above-mentioned laws, the regional autonomous 
organs need to have the competencies and resources to cover the health need of the entire Tibetan 
population. They also need the competencies to promote the traditional Tibetan medical and astro 
system strictly according to traditional practice. 
9)  Public Security 
 
In matters of public security it is important that the majority of security personnel consists of 
members of the local nationality who understand and respect local customs and traditions. 
What is lacking in Tibetan areas is absence of decision-making authority in the hands of local Tibetan 
officials. 
An important aspect of autonomy and self-government is the responsibility for the internal public 
order and security of the autonomous areas. The Constitution (Article 120) and LRNA (Article 24) 
recognise the importance of local involvement and authorise autonomous areas to organise their 
security within “the military system of the State and practical needs and with the approval of the State 
Council.” 
10) Regulation on population migration 
 
The fundamental objective of national regional autonomy and self-government is the preservation of 
the identity, culture, language and so forth of the minority nationality and to ensure that it is the 
master of its own affairs. When applied to a particular territory in which the minority nationality lives 
in a concentrated community or communities, the very principle and purpose of national regional 
autonomy is disregarded if large scale migration and settlement of the majority Han nationality and 
other nationalities is encouraged and allowed.  Major demographic changes that result from such 
migration will have the effect of assimilating rather than integrating the Tibetan nationality into the 
Han nationality and gradually extinguishing the distinct culture and identity of the Tibetan nationality. 
Also, the influx of large numbers of Han and other nationalities into Tibetan areas will fundamentally 
change the conditions necessary for the exercise of regional autonomy since the constitutional criteria 
for the exercise of autonomy, namely that the minority nationality “live in compact communities” in a 
particular territory is changed and undermined by the population movements and transfers. If such 
migrations and settlements continue uncontrolled, Tibetans will no longer live in a compact 
community or communities and will consequently no longer be entitled, under the Constitution, to 
national regional autonomy. This would effectively violate the very principles of the Constitution in 
its approach to the nationalities issue. 
 
There is precedent in the PRC for restriction on the movement or residence of citizens. There is only a 
very limited recognition of the right of autonomous areas to work out measures to control “the 
transient population” in those areas. To us it would be vital that the autonomous organs of self-
government have the authority to regulate the residence, settlement and employment or economic 
activities of persons who wish to move to Tibetan areas from other parts of the PRC in order to ensure 
respect for and the realisation of the objectives of the principle of autonomy. 
It is not our intention to expel the non-Tibetans who have permanently settled in Tibet and have lived 
there and grown up there for a considerable time. Our concern is the induced massive movement of 
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primarily Han but also some other nationalities into many areas of Tibet, upsetting existing 
communities, marginalising the Tibetan population there and threatening the fragile natural 
environment. 
11)  Cultural, educational and religious exchanges with other countries 
 
Besides the importance of exchanges and cooperation between the Tibetan nationality and other 
nationalities, provinces, and regions of the PRC in the subject matters of autonomy, such as culture, 
art, education, science, public health, sports, religion, environment, economy and so forth, the power 
of autonomous areas to conduct such exchanges with foreign countries in these areas is also 
recognised in the LRNA (Article 42). 
 
V APPLICATION OF A SINGLE ADMINISTRATION FOR THE TIBETAN NATIONALITY 
IN THE PRC 
 
In order for the Tibetan nationality to develop and flourish with its distinct identity, culture and 
spiritual tradition through the exercise of self-government on the above mentioned basic Tibetan 
needs, the entire community, comprising all the areas currently designated by the PRC as Tibetan 
autonomous areas, should be under one single administrative entity.   The current administrative 
divisions, by which Tibetan communities are ruled and administered under different provinces and 
regions of the PRC, foments fragmentation, promotes unequal development, and weakens the ability 
of the Tibetan nationality to protect and promote its common cultural, spiritual and ethnic identity. 
Rather than respecting the integrity of the nationality, this policy promotes its fragmentation and 
disregards the spirit of autonomy. Whereas the other major minority nationalities such as the Uighurs 
and Mongols govern themselves almost entirely within their respective single autonomous regions, 
Tibetans remain as if they were several minority nationalities instead of one. 
Bringing all the Tibetans currently living in designated Tibetan autonomous areas within a single 
autonomous administrative unit is entirely in accordance with the constitutional principle contained in 
Article 4, also reflected in the LRNA (Article 2), that “regional autonomy is practiced in areas where 
people of minority nationalities live in concentrated communities.” The LRNA describes regional 
national autonomy as the “basic policy adopted by the Communist Party of China for the solution of 
the national question in China” and explains its meaning and intent in its Preface: 
the minority nationalities, under unified state leadership, practice regional autonomy in areas where 
they live in concentrated communities and set up organs of self-government for the exercise of the 
power of autonomy. Regional national autonomy embodies the state’s full respect for and guarantee 
of the right of the minority nationalities to administer their internal affairs and its adherence to the 
principle of equality, unity and common prosperity of all nationalities. 
It is clear that the Tibetan nationality within the PRC will be able to exercise its right to govern itself 
and administer its internal affairs effectively only once it can do so through an organ of self-
government that has jurisdiction over the Tibetan nationality as a whole. 
The LRNA recognises the principle that boundaries of national autonomous areas may need to be 
modified. The need for the application of the fundamental principles of the Constitution on regional 
autonomy through respect of the integrity of the Tibetan nationality is not only totally legitimate, but 
the administrative changes that may be required to achieve this in no way violate constitutional 
principles. There are several precedents where this has been actually done. 
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VI  THE NATURE AND STRUCTURE OF THE AUTONOMY 
 
The extent to which the right to self-government and self-administration can be exercised on the 
preceding subject matters largely determines the genuine character of Tibetan autonomy. The task at 
hand is therefore to look into the manner in which autonomy can be regulated and exercised for it to 
effectively respond to the unique situation and basic needs of the Tibetan nationality. 
 
The exercise of genuine autonomy would include the right of Tibetans to create their own regional 
government and government institutions and processes that are best suited to their needs and 
characteristics. It would require that the People’s Congress of the autonomous region have the power 
to legislate on all matters within the competencies of the region (that is the subject matters referred to 
above) and that other organs of the autonomous government have the power to execute and administer 
decisions autonomously. Autonomy also entails representation and meaningful participation in 
national decision-making in the Central Government. Processes for effective consultation and close 
cooperation or joint decision-making between the Central Government and the regional government 
on areas of common interest also need to be in place for the autonomy to be effective. 
A crucial element of genuine autonomy is the guarantee the Constitution or other laws provide that 
powers and responsibilities allocated to the autonomous region cannot be unilaterally abrogated or 
changed. This means that neither the Central Government nor the autonomous region’s government 
should be able, without the consent of the other, to change the basic features of the autonomy. 
The parameters and specifics of such genuine autonomy for Tibet that respond to the unique needs 
and conditions of the Tibetan people and region should be set out in some detail in regulations on the 
exercise of autonomy, as provided for in Article 116 of the Constitution (enacted in LRNA Article 19) 
or, if it is found to be more appropriate, in a separate set of laws or regulations adopted for that 
purpose. The Constitution, including Article 31, provides the flexibility to adopt special laws to 
respond to unique situations such as the Tibetan one, while respecting the established social, 
economic and political system of the country. 
The Constitution in Section VI provides for organs of self-government of national autonomous 
regions and acknowledges their power to legislate. Thus Article 116 (enacted in Article 19 of the 
LRNA) refers to their power to enact “separate regulations in light of the political, economic and 
cultural characteristics of the nationality or nationalities in the areas concerned.”  Similarly, the 
Constitution recognises the power of autonomous administration in a number of areas (Article 117-
120) as well as the power of autonomous governments to apply flexibility in implementing the laws 
and policies of the Central Government and higher state organs to suit the conditions of the 
autonomous area concerned (Article 115). 
The above-mentioned legal provisions do contain significant limitations to the decision-making 
authority of the autonomous organs of government. But the Constitution nevertheless recognises the 
principle that organs of self-government make laws and policy decisions that address local needs and 
that these may be different from those adopted elsewhere, including by the Central Government. 
Although the needs of the Tibetans are broadly consistent with the principles on autonomy contained 
in the Constitution, as we have shown, their realisation is impeded because of the existence of a 
number of problems, which makes the implementation of those principles today difficult or 
ineffective. 
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Implementation of genuine autonomy, for example, requires clear divisions of powers and 
responsibilities between the Central Government and the government of the autonomous region with 
respect to subject matter competency. Currently there is no such clarity and the scope of legislative 
powers of autonomous regions is both uncertain and severely restricted. Thus, whereas the 
Constitution intends to recognise the special need for autonomous regions to legislate on many 
matters that affect them, the requirements of Article 116 for prior approval at the highest level of the 
Central Government – by the Standing Committee of National People’s Congress (NPC) – inhibit the 
implementation of this principle of autonomy. In reality, it is only autonomous regional congresses 
that expressly require such approval, while the congresses of ordinary (not autonomous) provinces of 
the PRC do not need prior permission and merely report the passage of regulations to the Standing 
Committee of the NPC “for the record” (Article 100). 
The exercise of autonomy is further subject to a considerable number of laws and regulations, 
according to Article 115 of the Constitution. Certain laws effectively restrict the autonomy of the 
autonomous region, while others are not always consistent with one another. The result is that the 
exact scope of the autonomy is unclear and is not fixed, since it is unilaterally changed with the 
enactment of laws and regulations are higher levels of the state, and even by changes in policy. There 
is also no adequate process for consultation or for settling differences that arise between the organs of 
the Central Government and of the regional government with respect to the scope and exercise of 
autonomy. In practice, the resulting uncertainty limits the initiative of regional authorities and 
impedes the exercise of genuine autonomy by Tibetans today. 
We do not at this stage wish to enter into details regarding these and other impediments to the 
exercise of genuine autonomy today by Tibetans, but mention them by way of example so that these 
may be addressed in the appropriate manner in our dialogue in the future. We will continue to study 
the Constitution and other relevant legal provisions and, when appropriate, will be pleased to provide 
further analysis of these issues, as we understand them. 
 
VII  THE WAY FORWARD 
 
As stated at the beginning of this memorandum, our intention is to explore how the needs of the 
Tibetan nationality can be met within the framework of PRC since we believe these needs are 
consistent with the principles of the Constitution on autonomy. As His Holiness the Dalai Lama stated 
on a number of occasions, we have no hidden agenda. We have no intention at all of using any 
agreement on genuine autonomy as stepping stone for separation from the PRC. 
The objective of the Tibetan Government in Exile is to represent the interests of the Tibetan people 
and to speak on their behalf. Therefore, it will no longer be needed and will be dissolved once an 
agreement is reached between us. In fact, His Holiness has reiterated his decision not to accept any 
political office in Tibet at any time in the future. His Holiness the Dalai Lama, nevertheless, plans to 
use all his personal influence to ensure such an agreement would have the legitimacy necessary to 
obtain the support of the Tibetan people. 
Given these strong commitments, we propose that the next step in this process be the agreement to 
start serious discussions on the points raised in this memorandum. For this purpose we propose that 
we discuss and agree on a mutually agreeable mechanism or mechanisms and a timetable to do so 
effectively. 
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